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FOREWORD
The study of strategic leadership as a formal, analytical
concept is relatively new. Therefore, concrete, historical
examples of leaders who have wrestled with the width and breadth
of strategic-level challenges are of inestimable value. Such
examples not only help to enrich the general understanding of the
concept, but also inoculate the associated discussions against
becoming overly abstract, esoteric, or idealistic.
In this connection, the study of General George C. Marshall,
covering his pre-World War II service as Army Chief of Staff,
1939-41, is as inspirational as it is illustrative. Marshall
began his tour of duty at a time when the Army was isolated
politically and institutionally, when it was profoundly
undermanned and poorly equipped, and when the prospects for
improving this dismal situation were far from encouraging. In
the ensuing 2 1/2 years, the Army's posture changed dramatically
for the better, largely through Marshall's Herculean efforts to
prepare for the kind of war he saw threatening on the horizon.
In effect, he "reconstituted" the Army. It is no exaggeration to
say that Marshall enabled America to enter the war with a
distinct "running start" in terms of military preparedness-something this country had never before succeeded in doing.
Marshall's contributions were no accident of history. They
resulted from the exercise of effective strategic leadership,
consciously and consistently applied across a broad spectrum of
activities and interests. This study analyzes the nature and
effects of that leadership and captures the magnitude of
Marshall's achievements as a strategic leader during what were
frequently regarded as the unglamorous prewar years.

WILLIAM A. STOFFT
Major General, U.S. Army
Commandant

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
George C. Marshall formally assumed the duties of Chief of
Staff, U.S. Army, on September 1, 1939. Earlier that same day,
Germany had invaded Poland, triggering war in Europe. Marshall
subsequently served over 6 grueling years as Chief of Staff,
becoming a popular American hero for his role in the war effort.
Winston Churchill's praise of him as "the true organizer of
victory" for the Allies has found an enduring resonance over the
years. Intuitively, he remains regarded as one of the greatest
strategic leaders of this century. In this connection, his
performance during the war years, 1942 to 1945 in particular,
gets by far the bulk of historical attention for obvious reasons.
Yet, his actions during the prewar years, 1939 to 1941,
offer equally valuable insights into the exercise of strategic
leadership in a democratic society. The challenges Marshall
faced in 1939 seemed monumental. In later years, Marshall
himself admitted that the prewar years were his toughest. As he
assumed his new duties, he felt an urgent need for massive
improvement in the Army's preparedness to conduct modern, mobile
warfare. He could easily imagine that America might eventually
be drawn into a European war, as it had been in 1917. The U.S.
Army in 1939 ranked 17th in the world in size, consisting of
slightly more than 200,000 Regular Army soldiers and slightly
less than 200,000 National Guardsmen--all organized in woefully
understrength and undertrained formations. The Army possessed
only 329 crude light tanks and only a handful of truly modern
combat aircraft within a total inventory of just over 1800
planes. It was a force equipped with the leftover weapons,
materiel, and doctrine of the last war. It had a grossly overage
officer corps, in which advancement was largely a function of
seniority. Captains, for example, were usually in their late
thirties or early forties. War-related industries were
infinitesimal. Congress and the public were united in their
staunch opposition to any increased military expenditures or
involvements abroad. The mood of the country was distinctly
isolationist. Extremely sensitive to this mood, President
Roosevelt was very reluctant to sponsor sizable military
increases. The potential political costs were too great. Against
this political backdrop, Marshall was a relatively unknown and
uninfluential figure in Washington. As Deputy Chief of Staff
(October 1938-June 1939) and as Acting Chief of Staff
(July-August 1939), he had appeared before Congress several times
and had interacted with the President from a distance. But he
had acquired no real personal leverage to shape the larger issues
which confronted him. Roosevelt had appointed him on the
recommendations of others; thus, Marshall had to start almost
from scratch to build a working relationship with the President.1
The situation inside the War Department painted an equally
unpleasant picture. The Secretary of War, Harry Woodring, was in

a continual feud with his primary civilian assistant, Louis
Johnson, who coveted his boss' job. With strong political
influence of his own, Johnson felt his position completely
secure; at the same time, he thought he had already secured
assurances of being Woodring's eventual successor. The two
seldom agreed on anything, and Marshall was caught squarely in
the middle of this dysfunctional situation. The War Department
had great difficulty speaking with a single voice on any issue.
Marshall walked a tightrope to keep from alienating either man.
At the same time, the War Department was locked into an
antiquated organizational setup by long-standing congressional
legislation. With multiple, semi-independent power centers and
no clear coordinating authority below that of the Chief of Staff
personally, the Department's structure was fundamentally
inefficient, unresponsive, and ponderous in decision making and
in following up on matters.
By the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the
Army's overall situation had changed dramatically for the better.
By then, over 1.4 million men were serving in the Army,
organized into 36 divisions and 64 air groups. War industries
were in high gear, making America the "arsenal of democracy."
The Army as a whole was experienced in army and corps-level
maneuvers, well along the way in preparing for mobile warfare.
The officer corps had been invigorated. A selective service
system was in place. America's leaders had made great strides in
laying the foundation for wartime strategy, and the War
Department had been reorganized to run more efficiently and
effectively.
Marshall cannot be credited solely for these
accomplishments; however, his role was pivotal at the highest
levels of government, in the halls of the War Department, and in
the field. He emerged with enormous influence in Congress, in
the government bureaucracy, and in the White House. He had
become a respected and trusted public figure who had placed his
personal stamp on America's preparation for war. Thanks to his
efforts, America entered the war with a running start and was
able to launch a large-scale offensive less than one year later.
In short, Marshall's accomplishments were gigantic. The depth
and breadth of his leadership were awe-inspiring.
That leadership will serve as the focus for this study, with
Marshall's actions from 1939 through early 1942 being analyzed
from the perspective of strategic leadership. The intuitive
notion of strategic leadership long pre-dates World War II;
however, as a formal concept, it is relatively new. Examining
Marshall through this prism will provide useful illustrative
insights and shed light on what has been for most an unglamorous
period overshadowed by the more dramatic events of the war.
Interestingly enough, Marshall's situation during the prewar
years has much in common with that of any strategic-level leader
in peacetime attempting to achieve what he considers to be an
adequate military force in the face of significant public

opposition. Many of the insights are timeless. Apart from this,
Marshall's leadership serves as an inspiring example in itself.

CHAPTER 2
THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP
The U.S. Army has formalized the concept of strategic
leadership. In fact, one of the Army War College's core courses
bears this title. According to this concept, the strategic
leader occupies a major position of leadership in his country's
larger and more complex organizations. He operates at a level
where he has significant opportunities to shape national military
strategy by virtue of his office. In so doing, he interacts
extensively with key authoritative figures across a broad
spectrum of governmental and private institutions involved with
influencing policy, legislation, or popular opinion. He usually
networks with a number of such people to exchange timely
information, ideas, or assistance in accomplishing important
tasks. Such networking yields considerable leverage in
influencing decisions and in lubricating the usually ponderous
machinery of government. In this regard, successful strategic
leaders excel at cultivating strong personal bonds of trust and
channels of communication in ever-increasing circles of
influence.
This interaction requires rather sophisticated interpersonal
skills such as polished communication abilities, well- developed
powers of persuasion, negotiating talents, a keen sense of
timing, and the sagacity to compromise on lesser issues to
achieve agreement on more weighty matters. In this regard, the
ability to build consensus among people of institutionally
diverse viewpoints is an essential attribute. Success requires
great peripheral vision. The strategic leader must have an open
mind and a refined understanding of how his institution relates
to the larger operating environment of government and other
policy influencers, in general and issue-by-issue. He must have
the knack for seeing issues from others' frames of reference,
allowing him to anticipate opposing positions and prepare cogent
counterarguments in advance.
Within his own organization, the strategic leader's
influence is most often exercised indirectly, oriented on
long-term change. He spends much of his time designing,
operating, or improving complex systems, processes, and
organizations. For the most part, this systemic approach
produces incremental adjustments over time rather than massive,
immediate, dynamic change.
In fact, the strategic leader must focus chiefly on the
future. He develops and articulates a strategic vision, which
paints a picture of the long-term end state he desires his
organization to achieve. This is his most essential task, for
from this vision the entire organization derives its sustaining
sense of purpose, motivation, and direction. It serves as the
touchstone for orchestrating all ensuing major plans and actions.
Ideally, it results in the entire organization moving

enthusiastically, in conscious and coherent unison, toward
meaningful, distant objectives.
Consistent with his vision, the strategic leader shapes the
values of his organization. He may reinforce some of the
existing values, downplay others, modify some, or introduce new
ones. In any event, he articulates those values which are
particularly important to him, stimulating their widespread
acceptance and carefully monitoring their manifestations. He
sets up his systems to reward those faithfully exhibiting such
values and to reprove those who do not. Relative to these
values, the strategic leader himself serves as the preeminent
role model. In so doing, he frames the cultural and ethical
fabric for the organization and emphasizes preferred patterns of
conduct.
Of equal importance, the strategic leader structures his
organization so that it can effectively pursue his vision and
reinforce the more important institutional values. Almost
always, this requires periodic adjustments, and can result in
incremental or radical reorganizations. Major shifts in the
overall operating environment also drive organizational changes.
An organization, for example, may have to operate differently in
wartime than it does in peacetime, even in pursuit of the same
vision and values.
In considering all proposed changes and policies,
organizational and otherwise, the strategic leader must
demonstrate the prescience to foresee their derivative effects,
often termed their second- and third-order effects. These are
non-primary, consequential results; they may be intended,
unintended, beneficial, or harmful to the organization. They are
usually not obvious beforehand. Taking these effects into
account, the strategic leader avoids or mitigates undesirable
by-products of his decisions, actions, or omissions. He can also
use positive effects as tools to influence the organization
subtly in desired ways.
In steering his organization, the strategic leader must
demonstrate additional competencies as well. First, he
establishes effective feedback loops so that he can monitor how
the organization is progressing, particularly regarding his
intentions and special interests. Second, he develops
sophisticated, competent leaders to whom he can confidently
delegate responsibility. These leaders are key to running large,
complex organizations; to providing honest and meaningful
feedback; to translating his vision into specific programs,
activities, and procedures; to inculcating desired values; and to
furnishing future strategic leadership in their own right.
Third, he allocates resources wisely.
The last point to make about strategic leadership is that
"it's lonely at the top." The strategic leader habitually
operates in a milieu of ambiguity and uncertainty. He usually

defines his tasks, articulates his vision, and takes positions
with little, if any, guidance from superiors. Most voyages are
through uncharted waters. Most choices defy recognition in
advance as being "right" or "wrong." It is not a vocation for
the weak at heart. The strategic leader thus works constantly on
the "fuzzy" edges of analysis, perception, and anticipation. He
must have the intense intellectual courage to oppose what he sees
as "poor" decisions and to advocate "good" ones of major impact,
especially when superiors have opposite inclinations.2

CHAPTER 3
MARSHALL'S STRATEGIC VISION
Marshall assumed his duties as Acting Chief of Staff in July
1939, at a time of great uncertainty. To many, including
Marshall, the flames of conflict worldwide seemed about to get
out of control. Europe stood on the verge of war, and Japan
seemed bent on establishing hegemony, by force if necessary, in
the Western Pacific and throughout the adjoining Asian
hinterlands. The comforting sense of security from external
threats that America felt in the 1920s and early 1930s seemed to
have evaporated. Somehow the world was now more threatening,
although specific threats to American security were difficult to
envisage or articulate clearly. For most Americans, the real
fear was that the United States would repeat its experience of
the Great War, being eventually drawn into a major conflict
overseas. In this unsettling mood of ominous ambiguity and
uncertainty, Marshall brought to his new duties a sense of
urgency and mission.
In planning and preparing for conflicts, strategic thinkers
by nature gravitate toward using worse-case scenarios. This is
because the consequences of not doing so can be so catastrophic
and definitive. Marshall was no exception in this regard. He
considered it likely that America would be faced with major
hostilities as a result of the continuing deterioration in
stability abroad. As a soldier charged with a major portion of
his nation's war preparedness, he had to act based on the
probability of such hostilities, involving perhaps multiple
theaters of war. Furthermore, he felt strongly that war might
come within several years. Hence, given the poor state of the
Army's readiness and the long lead time needed to correct
fundamental deficiencies and shortfalls, Marshall believed that
time was of the essence. This sense of urgency and
responsibility framed Marshall's strategic vision for the prewar
years.
Before discussing the specifics of that vision, two
prefatory points need to be made. First, Marshall admirers tend
to assume that he envisaged in 1939 exactly all he would do for
the next few years; the magnitude of his accomplishments, both in
quantity and quality, suggest that he must have had a detailed
blueprint from the beginning. This is clearly a myth. Evidence
suggests rather that he had a much more general concept, or
vision, of what he wanted to accomplish; that it was flexible
enough to support a wide range of actions; and that he chose
astutely from among those courses of action, based on changing
conditions at home and abroad. The strength of his vision was its
vitality. Despite changing circumstances, it served as a solid
structural framework upon which to hang the many, inevitable
adjustments, additions, embellishments, refinements, and actions
without collapsing. Second, the term "strategic vision" is a
by-product of the 1980s and 1990s. Marshall and his

contemporaries didn't use the term. However, Marshall did have
and consistently articulated what today would be called a vision;
furthermore, it served as the conceptual lodestar for his
actions. In Marshall's day, the notion of vision might have been
called a program, a plan of action, or a set of objectives.
Preparedness.
The centerpiece of Marshall's strategic vision was his
mental image of an American Army fully manned, trained, and
equipped in sufficient size during peacetime to deter aggression
against the United States and its more important interests; if
deterrence failed, this Army was to conduct decisive, successful
combat operations almost immediately to win the war while
continuing to expand, as necessary, through an efficient program
of mobilization. Key wartime industries would have developed to
the point that they could support the full war effort with needed
supplies and equipment. In short, Marshall wanted the Army and
related military industries largely prepared for war when the war
began. This meant considerable preparatory actions during
peacetime, the intensity and magnitude of which would be governed
by the seriousness of potential threats from abroad. At the
time, this was a revolutionary idea, never before achieved in
American history.3
This aspect of his vision grew out of his experiences in
World War I. He had been stunned by America's unpreparedness for
that war. A full year was required after Congress had declared
war before even a crudely trained army could be deployed.
Because of the lack of quality peacetime training, casualties
were needlessly excessive. Moreover, American war production
never had time to gear up. As a result, the American
Expeditionary Force (A.E.F.) fought largely with French- or
British-made guns, ammunition, airplanes, supplies, and
equipment. "We went into the line...[with] everything begged,
borrowed, or stolen--certainly not manufactured in America," he
remarked in 1931. Marshall was determined never again to allow
America to be placed in this "ghastly situation" of an "almost
criminal lack of proper preparation."4
For the new Chief of Staff, the notions of being prepared
for war and going about doing it were inseparable. In general
terms, he continuously struck the theme of progressing with a
"step-by-step coordinated increase." Above all, he wanted to
proceed "in an orderly manner" to build a "balanced force" of all
arms welded into "a perfect team." Remembering vividly the
dysfunctional panic and waste which resulted when an unprepared
America suddenly went to war in 1917, Marshall cautioned against
the extremes of doing nothing and of trying to do all at once.
In his experience, the first usually led to the second when the
public suddenly awakened to the danger of war. His remarks on
October 11, 1939 at a banquet are insightful:

Let me strongly emphasize the fact that we must not
become involved by impatience or ignorance in an
ill-conceived, overnight expansion, which would smother
well-considered methods and leave us in a dilemma of
confused results, half-baked and fatally unbalanced.
In his mind, the only workable antidote was a systematic,
well-thought-out series of incremental, digestible steps to
strengthen the country's military posture.5
First and foremost among such steps was the need to prime
the pump of the nation's military industrial base. Marshall
emphasized repeatedly that gearing up industry for military
production was the most time-consuming element in the
mobilization process. Much of what was to be used in war had to
be produced in peace. As he told an audience in Brunswick during
1938:
No matter how many billions of dollars Congress places
at our disposal on the day war is declared, they will
not buy ten cents worth of materiel for delivery under
twelve months, and a great deal of it requires a year
and a half to manufacture.
It took even longer before troops had these items in
sufficient quantity for meaningful training. In comparison, men
and units could mobilize at a much faster pace. Thus, for
Marshall, the first priority was the production of materiel in a
balanced program to establish the reserve stocks needed for
subsequent manpower mobilization. In fact, Marshall repeatedly
emphasized that any orderly, balanced mobilization required the
necessary equipment on hand before men could form new units and
train properly. In this connection, the massive equipment
shortages during mobilization for the Great War haunted Marshall
as one of the greatest nightmares of his lifetime.6
The Fighting Formations.
In addition to such materiel concerns, Marshall's vision of
a fully manned and trained force encompassed some very specific
criteria vis-a-vis the existing state of the Army. First, he
envisioned an Army organized into corps and field armies, with
their corresponding complements of "specialized" supporting
troops--such as military police, engineers, logistical elements,
air defense units, field artillery units, and signal elements.
In 1939, neither the Regular Army nor the National Guard had any
tactical corps or field army headquarters. During the lean years
since World War I, the Army had concentrated on keeping the
divisions as filled as resources permitted. Even so, all
divisions were outrageously understrength. The larger formations
required a certain "excess" which Marshall intended to create.
This was particularly important. In his mind's eye, the corps
and field armies constituted the fundamental fighting formations

of the next war. Second, he expected most corps to consist of
both Regular Army and National Guard divisions, operating after
much training as a truly unified team. Third, the corps and
field army formations could only attain true proficiency through
large-scale maneuvers.7
One can hardly overstate Marshall's emphasis on the
importance of these maneuvers. He believed strongly that any
future conflict would involve fluid movement and maneuver of
large formations on the battlefield. The speedy German victory
over Poland only reinforced his belief. Maneuvers featuring
opposing corps and field armies trained higher-level commanders
and staffs in the movement of large bodies of troops, a lost art
in the U.S. Army by 1939. Marshall regarded these maneuvers as
"a great college of leadership for the higher officers" and a
"wonderful practical schooling" for younger leaders and their
men. Only through maneuvers could a corps' or field army's
diverse elements interact under pressure in a realistic
environment; only in this way could they develop the
combined-arms teamwork needed to prevail in battle. Only in this
way could the larger headquarters hone the skills and procedures,
only imperfectly imagined in the school house. Marshall
emphasized this point during congressional testimony on November
30, 1939:
What appears satisfactory on paper too frequently we
find quite impractical in actual operations....there is
little that can be done in time of peace to simulate
closely the conditions under which troops operate in
war. Therefore, it is all the more important that we
make every effort to learn the practical business of
troop leadership and teamwork, utilizing field
maneuvers for this purpose, and especially to wash out
the over-theoretical or academic conceptions. We must
have more simplicity of procedure, and that requires
teamwork, and teamwork is possible only if we have an
opportunity to practice as a team.8
Maneuvers also contributed in other ways. They helped
identify significant flaws in the structuring of organizations of
all sizes, serving as an invaluable catalyst for refinement.
They also helped develop the kind of resilient, vigorous,
competent leaders which Marshall deemed essential for the
rigorous demands of fast-paced mobile warfare. The truly gifted
officers could be more readily earmarked for accelerated
promotion because their talents more visibly stood out during
demanding field duties.9
Autonomy Versus Independence for the Air Corps.
Another aspect of Marshall's strategic vision concerned the
Army Air Corps. As Deputy Chief of Staff, he had observed that
air officers had almost no representation on the General Staff

and that most General Staff officers had little interest in
air-related matters. In fact, there was a strong anti-air bias.
Many young air officers were going to Congress on their own, and
stirring up everything, creating a general muddle. "They had
something to complain about," Marshall later recalled, "because
they were not getting recognition, and the ground staff at that
time had little understanding of the air." Many Air Corps
supporters, inside and outside the Army, advocated an independent
air force modeled after Britain's Royal Air Force; they
cultivated congressmen to champion their cause. Many ground Army
senior officers, on the other hand, would have been only too
happy to rid themselves of the Air Corps.10
Marshall found this situation deplorable, but decided to
move cautiously. In his view, the Air Corps formed a
particularly critical part of the combined-arms team to be
forged. Ground and air officers had to grow to understand and
respect each others' roles if anything approaching the necessary
teamwork between them could be realized. This mutual
understanding and respect could not be dictated; it had to be
nurtured so it could flourish of its own accord. This was
Marshall's approach. He intended to increase incrementally the
autonomy of the Air Corps within the Army, in the process
developing its leaders so they could perform respectably as
senior commanders and staff officers. In fact, Marshall aimed to
give the Air Corps all the autonomy it could handle. However, he
kept this intention fairly close-hold, making it a semi-hidden
aspect of his strategic vision. To have articulated this openly
would have ignited a fire storm of attention, undermining his
efforts to effect subtle, almost imperceptible, attitudinal and
organizational changes. Marshall thus envisioned an autonomous
Air Corps, working harmoniously with the ground forces to form
the "perfect combined-arms team," in addition to performing
strategic bombing missions apart from the ground forces.11
In working toward this end, he wanted to postpone
indefinitely Air Corps independence. He felt that establishing a
separate air force on the verge of war would create
organizational chaos and make air-ground teamwork all the more
difficult to achieve. It was trying enough just dealing with one
other service, the Navy. An independent air force would result
in a quantum drop in unity of effort for a long time. This
Marshall wanted to avoid at all costs. He advocated expanding
the Air Corps' strategic bombing capacity, but he also insisted
on enhancing the air's tactical capability to support ground
maneuver. In an independent air force, the advocates of
strategic bombing could easily get the upper hand, causing
enormous problems in obtaining the needed support for ground
troops. Besides, in Marshall's sage judgement, the Air Corps
lacked sufficient educated and experienced senior officers to
establish its own effective General Staff, a prerequisite for
independence.12

Organizational Inadequacies.
Another element of Marshall's strategic vision, also only
faintly articulated, concerned the basic organization of the War
Department. That structure may have been adequate for the
sleepy-hollow pace of the 1920s and early 1930s, but by 1939 it
had become increasingly dysfunctional. Marshall had experienced
this first-hand as Deputy Chief of Staff. The War Department's
Staff consisted of many diverse sections, each of which had set
responsibilities for certain aspects of Army matters. The
problem was that no staff section by doctrine or tradition had
the authority to require collaboration and resolution of issues
across staff lines. Since most problems involved matters
affecting two or more staff sections, virtually every issue had
to percolate up to the Chief of Staff personally for decision.
This even applied to purely administrative and procedural rulings
of relatively little account. No one below the Chief had the
authority to force a decision, for example, when staff sections
disagreed fundamentally. The Staff, as a rule, felt comfortable
with the setup. There was a certain feudal quality about it.
Virtually every staff section head had direct and frequent access
to the Chief of Staff. Since such access equated to power and
prestige, it was a tenaciously guarded prerogative.13
From Marshall's perspective, the process was incredibly
inefficient. It overwhelmed him with an avalanche of unnecessary
detail that left little time to deal with larger, weightier
matters. Sixty-one staff officers had direct access to him; in
addition, the commanders of some 30 major and 350 smaller
commands fell under his immediate control in his role as the de
facto commanding general of all U.S. Army forces. Since staff
sections coordinated sequentially on issues, the process of
analyzing and proposing solutions was extremely slow. Even
worse, once decisions were made, no one staff section was
empowered to follow up comprehensively to ensure faithful
compliance. As a result, the War Department's routine was
unresponsive and fragmented, due to extreme structural
compartmentalization. Things were continuously falling through
the cracks.14
Marshall envisioned a much simplified and streamlined
command and staff structure, although he wasn't sure exactly what
form it should take. In general, he wanted an organization
wherein he could delegate authority to make and follow-up on
routine decisions. He wanted a mechanism by which some staff
entity could drive a rapid and comprehensive analysis of issues
across staff lines, ensuring an equally comprehensive follow-up
in implementing decisions. In short, Marshall intended to mold
an efficient system that relieved him of the crushing burden of
unnecessary detail so he could concentrate on broader policy
matters.15
In attempting to implement this part of his vision, Marshall

knew to proceed cautiously. Any major changes to the War
Department's staff structure required congressional approval in
the form of legislation. This would be difficult to obtain since
any radical reorganization would trigger a virtual "palace
revolt" by those who would be "disenfranchised" within the War
Department. The likely result would be an extended and ugly
debate aired through the open process of congressional testimony.
Even if successful, this approach "would do more harm than
good," Marshall commented. The Army would emerge with its
prestige tarnished and its morale diminished.16
Wishing to avoid such a Pyrrhic victory, Marshall decided to
move incrementally, although he had no comprehensive blueprint in
mind. By so doing, he demonstrated a masterful understanding of
the counterproductive derivative effects of proceeding in a more
direct and draconian fashion.
Reaching Out to the Navy.
The last element of Marshall's strategic vision in 1939
addressed the Navy. Again, without any detailed plan in mind, he
wanted to build a much more active and cooperative working
relationship with his sister service. First and foremost, this
meant establishing sound relations, personally and
professionally, between the Chief of Naval Operations and
himself. Marshall correctly perceived that, as war approached,
the Army and the Navy would have to act increasingly in unison on
a host of matters, extending from procurement to training, to the
conduct of joint operations, to the formulation of strategy.
Marshall intensely wanted to improve the foundation for a truly
propitious wartime working relationship at all levels.17
In summary, Marshall's strategic vision dealt almost
exclusively with the need to reshape and rebuild the Army. In
1939, the Army constituted a mere skeleton of an effective combat
force, inadequate even by World War I standards. The open
warfare anticipated by Marshall involved significantly higher
standards. Facing such a daunting challenge at a time of growing
hostilities abroad, it is not surprising that Marshall devoted
the great bulk of his mental and physical energies to preparing
the Army for war, the worst contingency foreseeable from the
ominous flow of world events. Only slowly, as the foreign
situation became increasingly unstable and as he matured in his
position, would Marshall concern himself with more profound
considerations of strategy. These were largely peripheral to his
initial strategic vision.

CHAPTER 4
EXPANDING THE ARMY, 1939-40
The Army in 1939 was in sad shape. Ranked 17th globally in
manpower, it consisted of only 9 Regular Army and 18 National
Guard divisions--all very much understrength and equipped with
obsolete World War I-vintage materiel. Of these units, only
three Regular Army divisions had enough men to conduct operations
effectively above the battalion level. On
September 1, 1939,
Regular Army strength was approaching 210,000 enlisted men, while
National Guard strength stood at slightly below 200,000 in twice
as many divisions. These figures fell well short of those
authorized by the National Defense Act of 1920, which Congress
had originally intended to serve as the framework for defense in
the post-Great War era. This legislation authorized a Regular
Army of 280,000 enlisted men and a National Guard of 450,000 men;
however, Congress had subsequently declined to vote the
appropriations to field the full authorized strength. It was a
hollow Army in every way.18
Hitler's invasion of Poland triggered hopes for substantial
increases, but those hopes were short-lived. President Roosevelt
allowed only a modest increase of 17,000 in the Regular Army and
35,000 in the National Guard; he claimed that it "was all the
public would be ready to accept without undue excitement."19
Marshall was disappointed, but made the most of this initial
expansion. He immediately carried out a long-contemplated
reorganization of Regular Army divisions. The old cumbersome
"square division" of four large regiments was replaced by a
"triangular division" structure of three, smaller, more mobile
regiments. Using the 17,000-man increase plus the additional
troops generated by the move to a smaller division, Marshall
created five fully manned divisions of the new type. He also
created a host of specialized units to serve as support troops
for one corps. Then he moved quickly to get these formations
into the field for meaningful training to build combined-arms
teamwork and to test the new organizational structure. He also
scheduled corps and division maneuvers for the spring of 1940,
and arranged for the Third Division to conduct a joint amphibious
operation with the Navy in January 1940 on the West Coast.20
Intermediate Goals.
While modest by later standards, these steps appeared
dramatic compared to the inactivity of the previous interwar
years. Marshall, however, had grander designs. While he had no
exact picture of the Army's ultimate size in accordance with his
strategic vision, he did have in mind some very specific
intermediate goals.
Marshall's most immediate goal was to bring the existing

troops "to a full state of efficiency as quickly as possible."
This translated into the divisional reorganization, the creation
of a corps headquarters and one set of corps support troops, and
the scheduling of maneuvers previously discussed. It also
involved ensuring that existing forces possessed all of their
authorized equipment and sustaining supplies.21
His next goal related to the General Staff's existing
mobilization plan. That plan called for an Initial Protective
Force (IPF) of 400,000 men, theoretically made up of 165,000
Regular Army soldiers and 235,000 men from the National Guard.
The IPF made up the immediate defense force, a component of the
larger Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP) force, which would
mobilize over a 4-month period. On paper, the PMP force
consisted of all 280,000 men of the Regular Army and all 450,000
men of the National Guard authorized by the National Defense Act
of 1920; it also included 270,000 men to be recruited as
replacements upon mobilization. Thus, the PMP called for a total
force of one million men. Marshall's plan aimed at expanding the
Army until it could provide the full IPF on short notice and at
procuring all critical supplies and equipment (e.g., ammunition,
rifles, artillery, tanks, trucks, uniforms) necessary for the
full PMP force. This procurement action was especially critical
to Marshall's calculations since it required 1-2 years to
complete. To field the IPF, the Army needed all 280,000 Regular
Army soldiers authorized by the National Defense Act; those not
counted against the IPF itself were either already stationed
overseas or needed to train recruits for the PMP force. To get
165,000 Regulars for the IPF required an inventory of 280,000 men
on hand from the beginning. In short, Marshall's approach was to
build up the PMP force, making it for the first time a truly
credible basis for national defense.22
In the process, Marshall sought to organize the IPF into
nine corps, each consisting of one Regular Army division, two
National Guard divisions, and 10,000 corps support troops. In
addition, he planned to establish two pure Regular Army corps for
use as a rapid deployment force in a sudden emergency. But his
overarching intent here was to create a more "unified force" in
the sense of a closer operational and associational relationship
between Regular Army and National Guard units.23
In striving toward these intermediate goals, Marshall would
grow frustrated repeatedly during the winter and spring of
1939-40. While his own sense of urgency permanently increased
with events in Poland, the mood of the country demonstrated a
distinct mercurial character. The surrender of Poland and the
uneasy quiet, the so-called "Sitzkrieg" or Phoney War, which
settled over Europe sapped the initial zeal to rebuild America's
defenses. Many expressed the hope that Britain and France could
handle Germany by themselves, allowing the United States to stay
out of the looming conflict.24

Discord within the War Department.
Secretary of War Woodring, by background a strong
non-interventionalist, was absolutely unwilling to push for
significant military increases. Locked in an open and
embarrassing power feud with Assistant Secretary of War Louis
Johnson, he had, in addition, lost most of his influence with the
President; his uncompromising views on neutrality were far too
extreme even for Roosevelt at the time. Johnson, a strong
advocate for increased airpower, saw no alarming need to expand
ground forces. Thus, Marshall could expect no help whatsoever
from his immediate civilian superiors in running interference on
Capitol Hill or at the White House. Wisely, he kept good
personal relations with both Woodring and Johnson although the
two seldom spoke to each other. By skillfully remaining neutral
in this feud, Marshall kept the War Department fully functional
and active during a period of potentially disruptive internal
discord. Even so, one could not say that the War Department
spoke with a single voice. For his part, Marshall received
virtually no guidance from above.25
Relationship with the President.
With no help from his civilian superiors in gaining entree
to the White House, Marshall found the President generally
indifferent to the arguments for sizable Army expansion.
Roosevelt was a Navy man with little cultivated interest in Army
matters. He proposed building hordes of planes and ships to deal
with future threats, knowing that such actions were more
palatable to the American people. Ships and planes implied a
purely defensive posture to fend away would-be aggressors from
the Western Hemisphere. But a large land Army clearly suggested
a possible intent to ship America's sons to fight abroad, a
message Roosevelt shied away from sending at this point. For
these reasons, the President significantly reduced the War
Department's requested appropriations for fiscal year 1941.
While the reduced figure was still high compared to that of
previous years, it fell far short of what Marshall needed just to
complete equipping the existing Regular Army and National Guard
troops. In addition, Roosevelt allowed no increase in troop
strength, to Marshall's great frustration.26
This frustration was intensified by the Chief of Staff's
personal relationship with the President. Roosevelt was a
daunting figure who usually attempted to dominate and terminate
conversations on his own terms. Marshall had trouble getting a
chance to present his views. Since the President didn't want to
discuss seriously any Army increases, he repeatedly and slyly
steered the subjects of their conversations in other directions.
So thwarted, Marshall had extreme difficulty getting his views
aired to the President in a comprehensive and consistent way.27
The Chief of Staff's approach was also a factor.

He was a

naturally formal person who strove to keep some personal distance
between the President and himself. He had seen how Roosevelt
tended toward more informal relations with cabinet members and
advisors; however, the President used semi-familiarity as a means
to poke fun at those individuals in order to dismiss ideas glibly
which did not appeal to him. Familiarity didn't breed contempt;
but it did breed an environment wherein the President had a clear
upper hand in flippantly disregarding thoughtful advice.
Marshall resolved to play by different rules. He wanted a
relationship based on mutual respect, one more geared to his own
reserved personal style. Thus, he refused to "drop in" at the
White House or curry favor with the President on purely personal
terms. His discussions focused strictly on business with no
unrelated personal chats. Marshall even deliberately refused to
laugh at the President's jokes; laughter only encouraged him to
filibuster his way around difficult questions requiring immediate
attention. He used levity to manipulate subordinates like
puppets. Marshall denied him the use of that tool.28
In the short term, the Chief of Staff's approach made it
very difficult for him to establish a good working relationship
with the President, at least until the General learned to be more
forceful in speaking his mind. For some time, Roosevelt was
clearly uncomfortable with Marshall's extreme seriousness. In
the long run, however, this approach had the desired effect. The
unwavering formality set an impressive tone of dignity and
respect in their relations; this, in turn, eventually gave
Marshall enormous influence with Roosevelt. Marshall was
regarded as his own person, not a Roosevelt creature. However,
this influence developed gradually as they came to know each
other better. It was hardly in evidence before May 1940.29
Initial Relations with Congress.
In addition to his initial rough going with the President,
Marshall also encountered a generally unsympathetic Congress.
With his presidentially scaled-down budget for 1941 in hand,
Marshall testified repeatedly before the House from February 23
until April 3, 1940. Only by intense, last-minute lobbying did
he succeed in averting draconian cuts. Even so, the House
slashed the proposed budget by almost 10 percent, and approved
only 57 of the meager 166 planes requested. Again, Marshall
mixed disappointment with deepening concern.30
Despite this frustration, Marshall set some key themes with
Congress which would return later to serve him well. In
February, he shared that part of his strategic vision concerning
the need for a balanced, step-by-step approach to military
expansion:
As to the existing crisis abroad, we must face the
facts. Any major developments there should be
paralleled by added precautions in this country. If

the situation grows more desperate, we should add to
the numbers of seasoned troops....If Europe blazes in
late spring or summer, we must put our house in order
before the sparks reach the Western Hemisphere.
Marshall went on to say that he opposed massive, sudden
expansions; he also opposed waiting until the last moment and
then attempting the impossible. Congressmen and the public would
recall these themes later when Europe did, in fact, begin to
blaze in a big way. Marshall's almost prophetic suggestion,
combined with his very reasonable and steady approach, would
later enhance his prestige greatly; he would appear as the man
with a coherent, consistent plan at a time of alarming
uncertainty. He would appear as a steadying hand at the wheel
when sentiments became almost frantic. The foundation for this
stature with Congress and the public was laid during the first
three months of 1940. The consistency with which he repeatedly
articulated what appeared to be a calm, deliberate, measured,
well-thought-out approach was crucially important in this
regard.31
Despite the lack of satisfactory progress in pleading his
case for minimal expansion, Marshall kept the faith. He remained
totally loyal to the President. He decided early to operate
faithfully as a member of the administration's team; while he was
frequently tempted to plead his case directly to the public, he
felt that any short-term gains would be dwarfed by adverse
second- and third-order effects, namely, the loss of trust and
confidence in him by the President. A certain group of senators
was very sympathetic to Marshall's designs. They privately
encouraged him to state openly that the nation's security
depended on more military appropriations than the President was
willing to grant. These senators pressured the Chief of Staff
intensely and repeatedly. So did many members of his own staff.
Yet, Marshall refused. He felt that direct appeals of this
nature violated the spirit of the Constitution regarding civilian
control over the military, a principle he deeply revered. Such
conduct would make him appear "political," power-hungry, and
self-serving. Most important of all, this kind of conduct would
permanently undermine his reputation as a "straight shooter," one
who deals with people and issues in a straightforward manner
without a complex web of hidden agendas lurking in the shadows.
This perception would be fatal to anyone in Marshall's shoes. It
would prevent him from ever obtaining the President's full trust
and confidence. It would also reduce his credibility on Capitol
Hill, where such disloyalty engenders no enduring respect or
admiration on a grand scale. People would regard him as just
another Washington climber with strong personal ambitions.
Marshall wisely decided that in the long run the interests of the
country and the Army would be best served by working "within the
team of which the president was the head." This approach
genuinely reflected his own temperament as well.32
Marshall was reluctant to make any direct appeals for

another reason. He wanted to avoid creating the impression that
he was at the forefront of pushing the country toward involvement
in a new world war overseas. If he got too far ahead of the
President and the Congress in this regard, the public and the
press would likely turn against him and undermine his
credibility. He would be branded as just another militarist.
For this reason, Marshall chose to tread softly in awakening the
public consciousness to the need for military expansion. A too
forceful effort could lead to a complete rejection of his views
and a dramatic reduction of his influence, to the ultimate
impairment of the entire rearmament effort.33
Only one thought really comforted Marshall about his
somewhat checkmated situation. He presciently expected events in
Europe to take a turn for the worse; if they did, he would be
prepared to capitalize on them. Plans for additional increases
were readied and placed on the shelf for the proper moment.
Marshall was already demonstrating a masterful sense of timing.
In considering the military appropriation bill for fiscal year
1941, Marshall remarked to his staff, "It will react to our
advantage if our bill is acted on at the latest possible date.
It is probable that events in Europe will develop in such a way
as to affect Congressional action." He was also demonstrating a
very refined sense of the art of the possible, both for the
moment and for the future.34
Training and Readiness.
While not particularly productive from a legislative
perspective, the spring of 1940 was extremely fruitful for Army
training. Soon after becoming Chief of Staff, Marshall had
acquired the funding from Congress for sizable maneuvers in 1940.
He placed great emphasis on their importance and dedicated
enormous resources to their preparations. First, the Regular
Army conducted extensive field training through division level
during the winter and early spring. Then he grouped the
divisions in several instances into opposing corps for a number
of larger maneuvers. One exercise involved over 70,000 men
organized into opposing provisional field armies. National Guard
training also improved through additional drill periods and an
extra week of field training obtained previously by Marshall from
Congress. This series of exercises upgraded profoundly the
readiness of the units involved and provided invaluable
experience for conducting future maneuvers of even greater
magnitude. Newly developed doctrine, techniques, procedures, and
organizations were tested and refined.
Marshall was pleased with the results, but Congress remained
skeptical of the benefits. He had to defend constantly the value
and costs of these exercises. As he noted, these were the first
genuine peacetime corps and field army maneuvers in the history
of the nation. Before the fall of 1939, he emphasized, "the
Regular Army, although highly developed in the efficiency of its

small units, has been largely an army of battalions." It was
stationed overseas and in 130 different posts across the country.
As he remarked during a radio broadcast in February 1940:
Seldom were regiments complete or united. Brigades
were a rarity. We possessed no complete divisions and
the battalions of the incomplete divisions were widely
scattered. The Army corps, the great battle team,
existed solely on paper.
The credit for the dramatic transformation in training readiness
in less than a year must go completely to Marshall. He drove the
preparations and overcame virtually every major obstacle
personally. With regard to this element of his vision, Marshall
followed through in impressive and consistent style.35
Army-Navy Relations.
At the same time, he significantly improved Army-Navy
cooperation. At his initiative, the two services conducted a
successful division-size amphibious exercise in January 1940.
The Army Area commander on the scene, Lieutenant General DeWitt,
subsequently wrote to Marshall:
There was not a single case of friction, and the good
will of each [service] toward the other was most
apparent. It was a very happy situation and I think
has built a solid foundation for the successful
initiation and outcome of any future exercises....The
basis for it all, of course, exists in the relationship
between yourself and Admiral Stark [the Chief of Naval
Operations] and it has permeated down through all
echelons in both services.36
This was music to Marshall's ears. He had very deliberately
nurtured a strong relationship with his counterpart in the Navy
involving a host of issues and interests. At Marshall's
initiative, they had established their own informal Joint Air
Advisory Committee outside the purview of the more formal and
bureaucratic Joint Board umbrella. This committee concerned
itself with aviation matters of mutual interest, with a charter
to advise the two service chiefs on employment considerations,
joint operations, common production specifications, and
common-use facilities. The Chief of the Air Corps headed the
Army's delegation, while the Chief of the Aeronautical Board
headed the Navy's. The real purpose behind the committee was to
facilitate the exchange of views and ideas, building consensus in
those areas where working in concert yielded greater
efficiencies; the design or production of planes and other
aviation equipment was perhaps the most frequently discussed
topic.37
Marshall was pleased with the general direction of Army-Navy

relations, which had "put the two services on a more solid basis"
and worked out "common problems...on a very intimate basis." In
his mind, the Army and the Navy had begun to work together
harmoniously on a considerably expanded scale. By so doing, they
were strengthening the foundation for the kind of joint teamwork
and unity of effort essential for any major conflict.38
Networking and Lobbying.
Despite making headway in some of these areas, Marshall
smarted from the 10 percent cut to his proposed budget for 1941
voted by the House on April 3, 1940. He now turned to an old and
powerful acquaintance for help. Bernard Baruch, an independently
wealthy banker, had served as a confidant to many presidents,
including Roosevelt. He was also an invaluable pipeline to key
congressional leaders. While serving as Pershing's aide,
Marshall had met Baruch in the early 1920s and had maintained a
cordial relationship ever since. Baruch generally supported
expanded military preparedness, and had bombarded the new Chief
of Staff with a steady stream of "good ideas"--most of which were
less than practical. Nonetheless, conscious of Baruch's
influence and large ego, Marshall assigned to a member of his
immediate staff the additional duty to keep in close contact with
the old man, to listen carefully to all his suggestions, and to
ensure they were brought to the Chief of Staff's personal
attention promptly. Marshall also ensured Baruch was well
informed of the Army's needs; he even had Baruch flown to
exercises and training centers to keep him abreast of the latest
problems and developments. Responding now to Marshall's request
for assistance, Baruch quickly arranged a private dinner with key
senators so Marshall could explain his needs. Baruch felt
strongly that the Army had never really gotten its story over.39
Events abroad helped somewhat. The Germans attacked both
Denmark and Norway on April 9, intensifying Marshall's concern
over the critical items which the Initial Protective Force still
lacked. The next night, at the dinner, the senators had the
fresh news of Denmark's surrender ringing in their ears.
Nonetheless, he faced a tough audience. Marshall pleaded his
case until 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning but, judging from the
stern faces and comments of the senators, felt he had failed to
persuade anyone. But his array of facts and compelling
arguments, pursued with a powerful sense of conviction, won the
day. Senator Alva Adams, speaking for most of his colleagues,
told Marshall, "You came [here tonight] before the committee
without even a piece of paper and you got every damned thing you
asked for."
Other European events would soon ensure that Marshall would
get much more than the equivalent of the 10 percent budget cut
back, but this dinner session was critically important for future
relations with the Senate. Baruch considered it "a turning point
in convincing such critics of preparedness as Senator Adams of

the urgent need for speeding the rebuilding of our defenses."
Even more important, Marshall had deeply impressed particularly
powerful senators and opened new channels of communication with
them, in the process demonstrating superb interpersonal skills.
He had profoundly expanded their trust and confidence in his
stewardship. Marshall's networking with, and through, Baruch had
paid handsome dividends.40
Confronting the President.
Five days later, on April 15, the Chief of Staff advised
Secretary Woodring that the worsening international situation
required him to advise an increase in the state of military
preparation. The President soon approved the request in
principle for additional critical items for existing units of the
Regular Army and National Guard, but then pruned the request down
from $25 million to $18 million.41
Marshall reacted strongly. What he had requested was the
bare minimum needed. He now sought to influence the President
indirectly by seeking the support of Secretary of the Treasury
Henry Morgenthau, one of the more powerful and influential
members of Roosevelt's inner circle. Morgenthau invited Marshall
to his office. The Secretary told him that the War Department
was making a mistake in "feeding the President little pieces here
and little pieces there" in terms of what was needed. He
encouraged Marshall to present a balanced proposal for overall
defense needs that they could sell to the Congress. The problem
to date had been Marshall's difficulty in getting Roosevelt's
attention long enough to make a thorough presentation. This had
been compounded by Marshall's natural deference to the
President's dominating conversational style.42
On May 11, the day after Germany attacked Holland and
Belgium, the Chief of Staff visited Morgenthau and presented a
program amounting to a staggering $650 million. Marshall was
brutally frank. Desperately needed, along with dramatic
increases in Regular Army manpower, were many fighters and
bombers to build a modern air force; ammunition plants; reserve
equipment for the entire Protective Mobilization Plan force; and
a host of equipment from blankets to rifles for the grossly
underequipped existing forces, Regular Army and National Guard.
His plan also called for raising the PMP force to 1.25 million
men, under arms and combat ready within 6 months of declaring
full mobilization.
Marshall's articulate arguments won Morgenthau over. He
agreed to serve as the Chief of Staff's advocate when they met
with the President two days later. The Secretary sagely advised
Marshall to speak frankly and forcefully: "There are too few
people who do it and he likes it."
Marshall took the advice.

The meeting at the White House on

May 13 was pivotal. On that day, news of dramatic German
successes against the French and British had just arrived. The
President proposed building 50,000 planes a year and expanding
the Navy; he saw no dire need to build up the ground forces. He
wasn't even interested in training enough pilots to fly a
substantially larger number of planes. He had locked onto
airplane production as an overly simplistic, one-dimensional
panacea for national security. Of course, this flew in the face
of all Marshall wanted in terms of a holistic, complementary
force of combined-arms elements, adequately equipped and
trained. Roosevelt dominated the conversation and dismissed
Morgenthau's suggestion that he hear out the Chief of Staff. "I
know exactly what he will say," commented Roosevelt. "There is no
reason for me to hear him at all." Neither Secretary Woodring
nor Assistant Secretary Johnson, who were present, supported
Marshall or the general thrust of his proposals which Morgenthau
had outlined earlier.
Nonetheless, the General was determined to have his day in
court. He walked over to the President and, looking down, firmly
and sternly asked for three minutes of his time to speak. The
President relented graciously. Marshall then made a concise
presentation, about the state of the Army, complete with anger,
frustration, and concern. The vehemence and emotional intensity
of the presentation stunned the President, as did the striking
facts. Roosevelt asked Marshall to return the next day with a
detailed list of what was needed. The result was the President's
agreement to submit a supplementary Army appropriation of $732
million, covering most of what Marshall had requested. Roosevelt
sent it to Congress on May 16.43
Marshall later characterized this encounter as the breaking
of a log jam. Again, his compelling arguments and articulateness
had largely carried the day. But they would never have
succeeded, had he not mustered the moral courage to speak
candidly and vigorously to challenge the President in a forceful
way. Marshall had for the first time made Roosevelt appreciate
the reasoning for a balanced force, as well as the necessary
components of that force. This was a remarkable achievement
which raised Marshall's standing with the President; this
experience altered their relationship fundamentally in a positive
way. The cordial working relationship which the Chief of Staff
had established beforehand with Morgenthau played a major
facilitating role.44
Public Perceptions Change.
While the German invasion of Denmark and Norway heightened
general concern, most Americans seemed confident that Britain and
France would triumph in the end by themselves. After all, many
military experts rated the French Army alone as the best in the
world. However, the spectacular German victories in Western
Europe during May and June 1940 dramatically changed this

thinking. Suddenly both the public and the Congress perceived a
clear and evident threat and became much more disposed toward
increased military spending. France had been completely
eliminated as a world power. The British Army had lost most of
its heavy equipment. To many, the invasion of Britain itself
seemed imminent. As Marshall later wrote,
The precariousness of the situation and its threat to
the security of the United States became suddenly
apparent to our people, and the pendulum of public
opinion reversed itself, swinging violently to the
other extreme, in an urgent demand for enormous and
immediate increases in modern equipment and of the
armed forces. 45
Congress warmly greeted the President's request of May 16
for an additional $1 billion, of which $732 million was earmarked
for the Army. As the German victories loomed even more total,
Marshall and others convinced Roosevelt to forward a second,
supplemental appropriations bill to the Hill on May 31; of this
amount, $709 million was for Army needs. Congress not only
approved both proposals but also added to them, appropriating
money to raise the authorized Regular Army enlisted strength from
230,000 to 375,000. But most important to Marshall, the approved
funds allowed production to start in earnest on all sorts of
items needed to equip the entire PMP force--from blankets and
uniforms to tanks and airplanes. The approved money would also
allow the Army to stockpile critical, long-lead items for a force
of two million, as well as to build an industrial base capable of
supplying a total force of four million.46
While satisfying in so many ways, these large increases
raised many apprehensions for Marshall. Recalling his vivid
World War I experiences, he remembered that the huge expenditures
in 1917 had also created huge and unrealistic public expectations
of immediate results. When these results did not quickly
surface, much outrage was directed at those in charge. In short,
Marshall knew fully the psychological derivative effects of the
enormous appropriations, and sought to inoculate the public mind
against those expectations. He also wanted to continue to sell
his concept for orderly, measured, systematic approaches to
further mobilization.
Thus, in his frequent testimony before congressional
committees and in a series of speeches and radio broadcasts, he
hammered home these themes. He emphasized that the recent
appropriations "would bear no fruit for at least a year, and for
the majority of items, a year and a half to two years." He went
on to caution that "an army--a large army--can not be recruited,
equipped, and trained overnight." He reiterated that the War
Department had long-standing, well-thought-out plans for
step-by-step coordinated increases, as required by the
international situation, and that he intended to proceed with
them in an orderly, businesslike manner. "My thought," he said,

"is...that we should resist ideas and enthusiasms that will not
stand the searching test of common sense. The impulse of
patriotic America is a wonderful thing, but its impatience to
overcome the delays of past indifference, can be a destructive
force." 47
Marshall's conduct during May and June of 1940 greatly
enhanced his stature with the public, the Congress, and the
President. His poise and calmness during such uncertain and
near-panicky times were widely noted. He had been a tower of
strength and resolve. He appeared to have a comprehensive,
flexible, reasoned plan to handle these and future developments.
More importantly, he displayed impressive self-confidence and
seemed to know what he was talking about. His words exuded
eminent common sense. His greatest achievement, however, was in
getting America in focus with his strategic vision for war
preparedness. In this whole realm of mobilization, he now
emerged as the leading coherent, conceptual force within the
government.
This period also witnessed the end of the Woodring-Johnson
feud. Given the international crisis, Roosevelt determined to
make a bold move. He named Henry Stimson, a 72-year-old former
Secretary of War and a Republican, as Woodring's replacement.
Johnson was replaced as well. Marshall and Stimson were men of
similar temperament and values. Stimson strongly supported steps
to strengthen America's preparedness. He and the Chief of Staff
worked hard at developing their relationship on the basis of
teamwork, mutual support, unity of effort, and respect. They
went on to form an extremely effective team. Once again, the War
Department could speak with a single voice. Here again,
Marshall's superb interpersonal skills, including a remarkable
sense of give and take, were critical in getting and keeping the
relationship on a sound footing. Very fortunately, Stimson was
equally adept at applying those skills.48
The Draft and the National Guard.
With Germany driving the final stake into the heart of
France, the next major public issue involving mobilization
centered about the draft, or selective service. Earlier that
spring, Grenville Clark, an influential New York lawyer, took up
the cause of introducing selective service as "the only fair,
efficient and democratic way to raise an army." He put together
a highly effective bipartisan movement to lobby congressmen,
generals, the press, and like-minded associates. He organized
dinners, wrote letters to editors, recommended those favorable to
his cause for influential positions, and proposed selective
service legislation to Congress. During May, his group
unsuccessfully sought the support of the President, as well as
that of Marshall, for the legislation. Both men felt strongly
that the time was not quite right. Public support, they
believed, was lacking for such a drastic measure. Certainly

Congress would summarily reject the proposal as premature.
Undaunted, Clark persisted in advocating the draft. Marshall
preferred to focus on recruiting up to the new authorized
manpower ceiling for the Regular Army; using the additional men,
he intended to bring all active divisions up to their full
peacetime strength. An immediate draft would disrupt this
process by causing many Regulars to be sent to train the huge
influx of inductees. Marshall was content to build up production
stockages for later manpower expansion.49
Nonetheless, Clark lobbied and lobbied. The completeness of
Germany's conquest of France and the appointment of his law
partner, Henry Stimson, as Secretary of War greatly assisted his
efforts. The fall of France especially galvanized public
sentiment in favor of preparedness; suddenly the passage of a
draft bill in peacetime seemed a distinct possibility.
Marshall, who had since the early 1920s philosophically
supported the notion of selective service, finally decided in
early June to support the measure, but only clandestinely at
first. He wanted to see the bill introduced as a ground-swell,
civilian initiative, a sort of popular act. If he lent his
official sponsorship to the legislation before it was formally
introduced, he thought the public would regard it as his bill.
This would likely precipitate an antimilitary backlash in
Congress; this development, in turn, could well have adverse
spillover impacts in disrupting future mobilization efforts.
Privately, however, with the President's blessing, Marshall sent
members of his staff to help write the legislation. He also
lobbied very discretely on the Hill.50
Once the bill was introduced, he went "all out in the
arguments for its passage...." He openly courted congressmen and
testified repeatedly before congressional committees, endorsing
the bill in the strongest terms. He argued that the possible
fall of Great Britain in the near term dictated the need to bring
both Regular Army and National Guard units up to full strength;
this could only be done with inductees. He did not believe it
was possible to form an Army large enough to meet likely
contingencies through voluntary enlistments alone. The only
realistic alternative was the selective service system, "which
would furnish sufficient personnel to bring the National Guard
and the Regular Army to full strength in the shortest possible
time, and to do this in a controlled and therefore efficient
manner, in contrast to the piecemeal, unbalanced basis of
voluntary enlistments."51
In supporting the draft legislation, Marshall insisted on
the need to federalize the National Guard and call it to active
duty for 18 months of training. He offered compelling arguments.
First, the Guard would be needed to train a large share of the
inductees by absorbing them into its understrength companies and
battalions. Second, the Regular Army could not be enlarged as an
alternative because it didn't have enough understrength units to

absorb so many inductees; it could create new units only by
emasculating old ones. Also, there was no equipment on hand yet
for additional Regular units, unless it were pulled from National
Guard units, an unacceptable proposal if the Guard was to
continue training. Furthermore, Guard units were manned at about
only 40 percent strength; they needed the inductee fillers and
the associated, intensified training to upgrade their war
readiness.52
Marshall's testimony was brilliantly informed,
comprehensive, and persuasive. Single-handedly, he represented
the administration, and beat back a plethora of counterproposals
and counterarguments. But he did have to compromise on one key
point to ensure passage. The bill would only call the Guard to
Federal service for 12 instead of 18 months.
On August 27, Congress authorized the call-up of the
National Guard for 1 year of Federal service. On September 14,
it approved the selective service legislation; 2 days later, the
first National Guard units reported for active duty. On
October 8, Congress approved a third supplemental appropriation
for the Army; it amounted to slightly more than $1.5 billion to
cover the costs of mobilizing the National Guard and implementing
selective service. It also provided for critical items needed to
expand the Army to 1.4 million men by the end of 1941.53
On September 16, Marshall made a broadcast on CBS radio
regarding the recently passed Selective Service Act. He stated:
...the National Defense Act of 1920, the lesson of our
lack of preparation in 1917 and 1918, is being put
forth into effect in a progressive, business-like
manner. The Selective Service Act has added the final
touch of authority to enable America to go to work
effectively at the business of preparing herself
against the uncertainties, the threatening dangers of
the immediate future.
Marshall's consistent and persistent pursuit of the very
core element of his strategic vision made this so. America was
now clearly on the road to preparing for war--a rocky road that
Marshall had roughly imagined a year before.54
By the end of the year, the results were astounding. At
that point, the Army had 800,000 men in the field undergoing
intensive training. The net gain in strength during the last
three months was 182,000 men, nearly equal to the total size of
the Regular Army when Marshall became Acting Chief of Staff in
July 1939. By Christmas, these soldiers were manning 18
divisions, with 9 more soon to appear. The two weak mechanized
regiments had grown into an armored corps of two divisions. The
passage of the Selective Service Act, in effect, authorized a
Regular Army of 500,000 men, a National Guard of 270,000 men, and
an inductee population of 630,000 men for an aggregate strength

of 1.4 million.55
Most of Marshall's time from September 1940 to June 1941 was
spent in managing this enormous expansion. Facilities had to be
erected, maneuvers had to be planned, recreational services had
to be provided, and equipment had to be procured and distributed.
It was a Herculean task which consumed the bulk of his time.

CHAPTER 5
TRAINING AND PRESERVING THE NEWBORN ARMY, 1941
Marshall's relations with the Congress appeared more cordial
than ever when he testified on behalf of a huge appropriations
bill during the spring of 1941. Congress granted a
record-breaking $9.8 billion for fiscal year 1942. Amended to
the accompanying text was mention of the "magnificent job" he was
doing. However, a major crisis for the Army loomed on the
horizon, one that would severely test the Chief of Staff's
influence with Congress, his interpersonal skills, and his
courage.56
Already in the fall of 1940, the War Department General
Staff had surfaced concerns about the expiration of the National
Guardsmen's Federal activation period of 1 year, as well as of
the 1-year term of service for the inductees. Repeatedly
throughout the first months of 1941, Marshall attempted to lay
the groundwork with Congress and the President for extending both
terms of service. The issue was a political hot potato which very
few politicians wanted to handle.
For Marshall, however, the matter seriously threatened to
undermine virtually everything of significance he had
accomplished involving manpower mobilization. The Army had used
draftees to fill out National Guard units, as well as most
Regular Army ones. Only two Regular divisions continued to
consist of strictly volunteers. Inductees, therefore, made up on
the average of 25-50 percent of a division's manpower across most
of the Army. Also, between 75-90 percent of each Regular
division's officers were Reserve officers called to active duty
when the Selective Service Act was implemented; their terms of
service were legislatively tied to those of the National
Guardsmen. Thus, about 600 Reserve officers in every Regular
division would be entitled to demobilize when the National
Guardsmen did. Demobilization of the Guard and the inductees at
their 1-year mark of individual service would emasculate the
Army; the rump would form a disorganized, disjointed skeleton
force incapable of responding to any sizable crisis for many
months. The active force would go almost overnight from a
robustly trained one to a largely ineffective, shattered one
which would require rebuilding from the ground up. This
development would set back the Army at least 1 1/2 years, perhaps
2. As Marshall commented later, "It meant the complete
destruction...of the fabric of the army we had built up. We
would be in a worse predicament than we were a year before."57
Forcing the Issue.
Seeing the flow of international events as increasingly
ominous, Marshall determined to force the issue. In courting a
host of key congressmen, however, he soon discovered that few of

them were willing to champion his cause. While many admitted
privately the soundness of extending the National Guard and draft
service terms from a purely military perspective, few were
willing to pay the political price at the polls the following
fall. The public, they feared, would regard any such extension
as a breach of promise.
Finally, in mid-June, Marshall urged the President once
again to ask Congress for the term extensions. Time was running
out. Roosevelt, however, shied away from making the request.
Deeply concerned, Marshall opted to take a bold step. He cleared
the idea with the President of making some sort of public
statement on his own recommending the extension.
Wrestling with the question of how to do so, he settled on a
fairly creative approach. He could not make a direct, formal
appeal to Congress without appearing to be disloyal by attempting
to go around the President. At the same time, he did not want to
appear as the mouthpiece of a President who himself was afraid to
raise the issue. Marshall could, however, write a nonpolitical,
formal report addressing the dire situation. Previous chiefs of
staff had, on occasion, produced annual reports discussing the
posture of the Army at the end of the fiscal year. (The fiscal
year ended on June 30 at this time.) Marshall had neglected to
write one since becoming Chief of Staff, but there was still
enough time for him to prepare a report before the end of June.
He would appear to have dropped the annual report in favor of a
more comprehensive biennial one. Addressed to the Secretary of
War and releasable to the press, this report would be regarded as
a legitimate and proper channel for Marshall to express himself
impartially on the need for the service extensions.
Consequently, he and his staff worked day and night to produce
it.58
The report was skillfully prepared. In fewer than 40 pages,
Marshall carefully laid out the situation. He used very
understandable, nontechnical language, accompanied with simple,
clear charts and maps to depict the Army's posture. After
describing the enormous achievements made in the previous 2
years, he made a strong plea for the service extensions, lest the
existing active forces evaporate.
He released the report to the press on July 3, hoping for a
response. He got it almost immediately. The report was soon
engulfed in a fire storm of controversy. First, Marshall had
neglected to forewarn the administration's supporters in
Congress; they felt blind-sided by the unexpected release of the
report from out of the blue. Second, he had failed to construct
a press release focusing attention on the points he wanted to
highlight. As a result, the press not only dug out his argument
but also focused on his use of the nebulous term "task forces,"
seeing in the use of the term the Army's veiled intent to form
expeditionary forces to fight overseas. Isolationists and
neutralists denounced this surmised suggestion with harsh words,

many of which were aimed at a "warmongering Roosevelt." Two days
later, the British commander retreating before Rommel in North
Africa added fuel to the fire. He was quoted as saying that the
British would soon receive the American supplies, equipment, and
manpower they needed to prosecute the war successfully. Two days
later, another British commander remarked publicly, "We certainly
are going to need American manpower, just as we did in the last
war." These comments, perfectly ill-timed, seemed to confirm the
worst suspicions for many about Marshall's "task forces."59
From this unpromising start, Marshall made a steady
comeback. He quickly soothed ruffled congressional feathers with
some artful explanations of his altruistic concerns and motives;
he quickly won forgiveness and support from key Democratic
leaders on the Hill now that the battle was joined. Then he
addressed the controversial issue of task forces by assuring
Congress publicly and privately that the term had a specific
technical meaning which in no way implied the eventual use of
American troops to fight abroad a la World War I. Task forces,
he explained, were simply tailored groupings of units to
accomplish given missions; they could refer to units of varying
sizes, from a battalion to a corps. He had used the term in the
report in connection with asking Congress to lift the existing
ban on employing drafted soldiers outside the Western Hemisphere.
He foresaw instances where "task forces" might be needed on
short notice to perform contingencies outside the Hemisphere in
response to immediate threats against U.S. interests; in such
instances, the ban posed great organizational and planning
problems. With the exception of two all-volunteer Regular
divisions, no existing large formations could be sent without a
major reorganization to strip out all inductees and replace them
with Regulars from other outfits. From a military standpoint,
this was a recipe for disaster which would destroy unit integrity
across the entire Army on the verge of a deployment.
Convincing Congress.
Marshall's explanation was too vague to overcome the
distrust in many circles of the President's motives. Neutralist
and isolationist sentiments regarded lifting the ban as
tantamount to giving Roosevelt a "green light" to lead the United
States into the war. Congressmen advised Marshall that the
legislation had no chance of passage unless he dropped the
request to lift the ban. He agonized at length. The ban
hamstrung the Army profoundly in planning for contingencies;
Marshall already knew, but couldn't yet disclose, that the Army,
for example, would take over the defense of Iceland from Britain
in the near future. Without a lifting of the ban, the units
designated to occupy the island would have to be completely
reorganized. Would this gut-wrenching process be required on an
ad hoc basis as each such contingency arose?
In this case, Marshall wisely applied the art of the

possible. He correctly assessed that the congressional advice he
had received was sound. It was more important to secure the term
extensions, thereby keeping the Army from disintegrating.
Marshall quickly recognized that he had no chance of doing so if
he remained unyielding about the ban. Therefore, he reluctantly
accepted a compromise dropping further discussion of the ban in
return for the promise of broadened congressional support for the
term extensions. It was a painful but necessary pill to swallow.
In this instance, to have insisted on having the whole pie would
most assuredly have led to having none.
As he continued to lobby Congress, Marshall discovered that
much of the vehement opposition was directed against the
President personally. In fact, significant numbers of both
Republicans and alienated Democrats intended to vote against the
measure on purely political grounds to embarrass what they
regarded as an increasingly "dictatorial," high-handed President
fixed on somehow involving the United States in a another major
war.60
Facing this opposition, the Speaker of the House, Sam
Rayburn, convinced the President and the Secretary of War that
Marshall should personally lead the fight. Rayburn observed, "Of
all the men who ever testified before any committee on which I
served, there is no one of them who has the influence with a
committee of the House that General Marshall has." After all, he
had convinced enough congressmen the year before to vote for the
nation's first ever peacetime draft, despite Rayburn's prediction
that the votes were simply not there.
Thus, with only a brief Presidential radio message as
support, virtually the entire burden of seeing the battle through
fell on Marshall's shoulders. At this point, few legislators
would openly support the extensions. One congressional aide
noted, "In forty years on the Hill he had never seen such fear of
a bill." As Marshall later commented, "the trouble was we were
undertaking very severe war measures and we were not at war."61
During the ensuing month, the Chief of Staff testified
repeatedly before committees of both houses of Congress. In the
process, he emphasized critical themes which profoundly softened
the opposition and transformed the debate to a higher level than
that of pure politics. The selection and articulation of those
themes demonstrated considerable sophistication in the art of
persuasion, meriting a more detailed analysis.
First, Marshall argued that the effort to seek the
extensions was his initiative alone, born of a genuine concern
for the military security of the country. He told the House:
My recommendations were based on military necessity
only, and I was especially concerned that they be made
in a manner that was clearly nonpolitical. I consulted
no one with respect to them and no one knew I was going

to make them. I thought that my action was in the best
interests of national defense.
He made a similar statement to the Senate:
I made the specific recommendations regarding the
extension...purely on the basis of a military necessity
for the security of the country. The Commander in
Chief, that is, the President, had no knowledge that I
was going to make them. My report was submitted to the
Secretary of War and at the same time was released to
the press.
He went on to say that he had tried to keep as wide a separation
as possible between military necessity, the sole basis for his
recommendations, and "political considerations which are matters
for the decision of the President and the Congress." He further
submitted "that the question of readiness for service in the Army
should not be confused with those political considerations."62
Next, Marshall emphasized the gravity of the moment. "The
declaration of an emergency does not create it," he testified.
"An emergency exists whether or not Congress declares it. I am
asking you to recognize the fact--the fact that the national
interest is imperiled and that an emergency exists. I am not
asking you to manufacture a fact." He then proceeded to describe
the adverse impacts on the Army if the extensions were not
approved, noting that such actions would leave the nation largely
defenseless in the face of uncertain, unsettling developments
abroad. He went on to expand this thought before a Senate
committee:
...in view of the international situation and its
rapidly increasing threat to our security, I submit, on
the basis of cold logic, that the virtual disbandment
or immobilization of two-thirds of our enlisted
strength and three-fourths of our trained officer
personnel at this time might well involve a national
tragedy.63
Then Marshall went on with a comment that hit hard at
something near and dear to Congress--the continuing vitality of
the National Guard. He pointed out that if the National
Guardsmen were sent home en masse, they would have to be replaced
permanently by Regular Army units over time. "It will eliminate
the National Guard from further serious consideration as a factor
in the national defense," he told the House. "It will have to be
placed in a much lower category for the immediate defense of this
country, and it would be necessary to maintain large forces of
some other kind." This thought was extremely sobering for
Congress, and one prone to give pause.64
Marshall then struck several other themes that made good
sense. He did not see any immediate need for additional

increases in forces. Rather, he wanted to focus on improving the
quality of the existing divisions, something that could only be
done if the term extensions were granted. He told a House
committee, "We prefer to have our existing units reach as high a
state of efficiency as possible, rather than to take them apart,
spread them into a larger number, and start all over again." In
addition, he didn't intend to keep inductees or National
Guardsmen on active duty indefinitely. They would be released on
a case-by-case basis, but in a way to allow their gradual
replacement by new inductees so as to minimize personnel
turbulence and the associated adverse impacts on unit readiness
and training. To do so, he wanted to be able to use his own
judgement in applying a flexible rule rather than wearing the
straightjacket of meeting a mandatory deadline for all at once.
In this regard, he appealed to the confidence of Congress in him
personally. He said, "You must trust in my good faith, in our
professional common sense. I have tried to be very frank. The
War Department has been scrupulous in its efforts to meet, as far
as possible, the desires of Congress. Though encompassed with
too definite and too numerous laws, we have not tried
circumlocution or evasion." In short, he appealed to the great
store of good will he had built up with the Congress in the
previous 2 years.65
Marshall then made a connection with something he had
consistently emphasized before Congress--the concept of
proceeding in a deliberate, measured, businesslike manner to
develop appropriate military forces. To send all the Guard units
and initial inductees home at once flew in the face of such an
approach--an approach Congress had come to embrace increasingly
over time through Marshall's many testimonies.66
At this point, under congressional advice, Marshall agreed
to another compromise. With the President's approval, he
accepted an amendment which limited the term extensions to a
maximum individual service of 18 months. This timely compromise
made the whole issue more palatable to the public and greatly
improved the promise of the bill's passage, although he had
earlier opposed this restriction most vehemently.67
As the time to vote neared, Marshall increased his lobbying
efforts, especially with the House; there significant opposition
remained. Notably, he pleaded with 40 key Republican members for
5 hours, invoking appeals to both logic and patriotism. About 12
were clearly moved at that point to declare support for the
measure, even though they thought such support would cost them
the next election.68
Finally, Marshall successfully argued against a counterplan
proposed by House Republicans and some antiadministration
Democrats. It sought to shift responsibility from the Congress
to the President for extending the inductees' terms of service.
Under the provisions of the Selective Service Act, draftees could
be discharged into the Reserve. Then, as members of the Reserve,

they could be recalled by Presidential authority alone into
active service for an additional 12 months. Marshall strongly
opposed this approach for what it would be regarded--an evasion
of congressional responsibility. He emphasized, "I think it
would have a most unfortunate effect on morale....We would give
our men the feeling that we were taking some unfair though legal
advantage of them." His arguments found the mark. The
counterplan was dropped.69
On August 7, the Senate voted, 54-30, to support the term
extensions. Everyone expected the subsequent House vote to be a
real squeaker. It was. On August 12, the House voted, 203-202,
in favor of the resolution to extend the terms of service. The
Army had been saved by a single vote.70
Marshall's role in this whole episode was absolutely
pivotal. Faced with a serious situation most politicians wanted
to avoid, he forced the issue into the open public forum. He did
so by the brilliant and creative maneuver of issuing a biennial
report when all other doors of formal communication seemed
closed. Despite some missteps surrounding the report's issuance,
he made a rapid recovery. He alone shouldered the
administration's burden of arguing for the term extensions before
Congress, transforming a no-win situation into a winning one. He
did so by striking a series of convincing themes, which gave
congressmen enough solid ground to justify voting for the
extensions. He also executed a superb, behind-the-scenes
lobbying effort and demonstrated impressive skills at striking
timely compromises. His growing circle of civilian, and
especially congressional, contacts also played a key role.
Important to note, Marshall's persuasive talents were not applied
manipulatively; he never sought to mislead or deceive. What he
said, he meant fully from the mind or from the heart. When he
appealed on altruistic grounds, he acted from altruistic motives.
This approach gave him a moral high ground and a strength of
character which greatly deepened the respect which Congress
already had for him. If he was the architect of the Army as it
existed in July 1941, he was the savior of that Army as it
continued to exist beyond September. His will and his efforts
had made the difference.
The GHQ Maneuvers of 1941.
The late summer and early fall saw the fruition of
Marshall's efforts in another arena. He had carefully planned a
series of large-unit exercises which far eclipsed those of the
previous year. He gave these exercises particular emphasis.
Corps maneuvers were staged separately during August in the
Second and Third Army areas. Then these forces joined others in
Louisiana and Texas during September for field army-level
exercises which made a deep impression on the country. Nearly
400,000 men participated. Paratroops were used in exercises for
the first time, as was an armored corps in full maneuver with

tanks over extended distances. The Chief of Staff was pleased at
the demonstrated improvement in the ground forces. Finally, in
November, the First Army and the IV Armored Corps maneuvered in
the Carolinas, showing still further improvement.71
Thus, as Pearl Harbor approached, Marshall had in 1941 both
kept the Army together and intensified its training. These
stunning achievements did not come easily; they resulted from
enormous efforts and struggles, in the cause of which George
Marshall exercised remarkably competent leadership at the highest
levels of government.

CHAPTER 6
RELATIONS WITH THE CONGRESS
As previously outlined, Marshall established a progressively
effective and influential relationship with Congress during the
period, 1939-41. He developed this relationship gradually
without much outside assistance from the rest of the Executive
Branch, and tempered it with several controversial legislative
campaigns. Later on, Marshall would be declared as Time
Magazine's "Man of the Year" for 1943. In the caption article,
Time said the following about the Chief of Staff:
Never in U.S. history has a military man enjoyed such
respect on Capitol Hill. One reason is that he...is
completely free of political concerns. When Colorado's
Senator Edwin C. Johnson mentioned him as a
Presidential possibility, General Marshall's negative
reaction was so unmistakably genuine that Congress
knew: this man is a trustee for the nation.
During World War II, the Congress continued to cooperate
almost instinctively and unquestioningly with the proposals of
General Marshall. The basis for this special relationship was
firmly anchored in the experiences of 1939 to 1941.72
Above all, Marshall saw himself as the loyal servant of the
Republic and the Constitution which served as its framework. He
fully trusted in the concept of military subordination to
civilian authority, and displayed enormous respect and deference
both to Congress and his civilian superiors. He fully accepted
the notion that the burden to articulate persuasively the
country's security needs rested squarely on the shoulders of its
military and naval leaders. He emphasized this point in December
1939 during a speech before the American Historical Association:
"In our democracy where the government is truly an agent of the
popular will, military policy is dependent on public opinion, and
our organization for war will be good or bad as the public is
well informed or poorly informed regarding the factors that bear
on the subject." About two months earlier in another speech, he
had remarked: "The great problem we have in going before
Congress is one of being able to present simply and
understandably the general requirements and respective
priorities."73
For this reason, Marshall prepared assiduously for any
testimony before congressional committees. He purged from his
remarks virtually all confusing technical terms, acronyms, and
military jargon. He always attempted to communicate in a style
that the average man on the street could understand.
He continued to have great faith in Congress and the public.
If they were properly and completely informed, he felt, they
would make generally sound decisions about military policy. For

this reason, Congress was not the enemy. Rather, congressmen
were loyal Americans generally trying to do the right things as
they understood them. To staff members who wanted to avoid
potentially embarrassing revelations to a Senate Committee,
Marshall remarked, "It seems to me that a free and easy and
whole-souled manner of cooperation with these committees is more
likely to create an impression that everything is all right in
the War Department, than is a resentful attitude." He continued,
"...it must be assumed that members of Congress are just as
patriotic as we ....I do not believe that we should adopt an
attitude of official nervousness." On another occasion, he noted
"that 95 percent of the members of Congress were worthy of his
high regard." Thus, Marshall's approach to Congress was founded
from the beginning on respect and deference rather than fear or
apprehension. He welcomed opportunities to go before Congress to
get his points across, and he brought to all congressional
relations a deeply genuine spirit of cooperation that made a
profoundly positive impression even on congressmen who opposed
the main thrusts of his proposals.74
Congressional Committees.
Marshall's performance before congressional committees was
impressive for other reasons as well. First, he habitually spoke
without any notes. He did so consciously for effect, as he later
recalled, "because I found that the minute you began to read you
lost your audience. It was better to forget something." This
technique also had another impact. It clearly helped establish
Marshall as an "expert," the man clearly at the military helm in
the War Department. His words were his words, not words written
by someone else to be read before the committee. They were
spoken with conviction and with piercing eye contact. This
approach, coupled with his clarity of expression and mastery of
associated facts or considerations, immeasurably enhanced his
credibility. He was clearly someone "in charge" who knew what he
was trying to do. This impression, combined with his ability to
think on his feet, rapidly established Marshall's credentials as
a man of considerable intellectual capacity, a quality
congressmen inherently respected and admired.75
Second, his manner and mood in testimony were always
correct, given his ingrained respect for the institution. He
always asked or proposed, but never demanded. He was never
arrogant. He avoided talking down to congressmen. He
demonstrated an often disarming frankness in answering questions
or admitting problems. He avoided any effort to manipulate,
obfuscate, or deceive; his responses were honest and
straight-forward, even if they damaged his immediate cause.
Marshall felt that long-term trust and confidence from Congress
were infinitely more valuable than any short-term benefits
acquired deceitfully. Besides, Marshall's own moral code
rejected any sort of dishonest behavior. He also displayed an
enormous capacity for patience under questioning that was

frequently less than sympathetic or intelligent. In this regard,
he demonstrated great restraint, never losing his temper or
becoming emotionally distraught.76
Third, he strictly refused to be drawn into the realm of
political considerations. His approach was that of a military
servant of the Republic who was concerned only with the military
considerations for the nation's security. He clearly
communicated on several occasions that he was his own person, not
another mouthpiece for the administration. He pointed out to
Congress that the President and he did not always see eye-to-eye
on needed appropriations. Incidentally, he did this in a way
which dispelled the notion that the President was a War Hawk or
Warmonger, as he was often accused of being by his adversaries;
the President always emerged with a flattered image from such
revelations. This general approach often transformed debates
about specific issues from a partisan to a bipartisan level of
consideration, something few others in the Executive Branch could
achieve at the time.
Fourth, Marshall came across as one uninterested in personal
fame, recognition, or gain. He generally refused press
interviews and discouraged writings about himself. His manner
before Congress was exceptionally modest and self-effacing. He
never bragged or boasted, but rather pursued his duties in a
quiet, sober, intense fashion. Even his famous biennial report
of 1941 downplayed his monumental personal role in building up
the Army. From time to time, he quickly suppressed suggestions
that he seek public office, even perhaps the Presidency in the
future. To Congress, Marshall was a man without political
ambitions.77
Fifth, Marshall repeatedly made it clear that his requested
military increases were not motivated by any desire to involve
the country in war. "I am more of a pacifist than you think," he
told one subcommittee. "I went through one war, and I do not
want to see another." Nor were his proposals aimed at empire
building, or increasing the Army for its own sake, as he stated
convincingly to Senator Truman's committee in 1940:
There is not the slightest thought in any of our minds
of trying to utilize this emergency to aggrandize the
Army, or of making exorbitant demands to put something
over, as it were, under the pressure of the situation.
These sentiments gradually raised his stature in the minds
of many congressmen to that of a "trusted honest broker" in
administering the security needs of the nation.78
Acting in Good Faith.
In dealing with congressional matters, Marshall invested
enormous chunks of his valuable time. If a congressman asked for

a time to visit to discuss something, Marshall made it a habit to
go to the congressman. He personally reviewed most of the
replies to congressional inquiries. Eventually he established a
Legislative and Liaison Division, headed by a general officer, on
the General Staff to assist him with handling the ever increasing
incidence of congressional questions and requests. Showing such
deference to Congress only increased its favorable impression of
him as a man who always acted in good faith and in a genuine,
cooperative spirit.79
Showing such deference to Congress, however, did not mean
that Marshall was unwilling to say "no" to inappropriate requests
or appeals. Time and time again, he strictly refused requests
for such things as "political" promotions, appointments or
assignments for congressional acquaintances. One example in
particular illustrates this. In the fall of 1941, the Army was
deeply into the process of identifying and purging incompetent
and overage officers, especially senior officers, from its ranks.
Two of the officers so identified just happened to be generals
from the Texas National Guard. They had been recently sent home
and retired. Marshall had personally reviewed their cases and was
absolutely convinced, based on extensive evaluations, that they
should be retired. Subsequently, Senator Tom Connally of Texas
raised a storm of protest directly to the Chief of Staff and the
Secretary of War. This was a fundamental matter of principle to
Marshall. He refused to give any ground whatsoever, explaining in
great detail the basis for his original decision. The Senator
quickly realized that he was treading on shaky ground and
relented; he came away with an even higher regard for Marshall's
competence, honesty, moral courage, integrity and strength of
character. This and a host of like incidents made it clear that
Marshall was no soft touch. When it came to core principles, he
was as tough as they got. And it was this quality which
tremendously increased congressional respect and admiration for
him over time.80
In summary, the Chief of Staff's high regard for congressmen
as partners, not adversaries, in the democratic process led him
to establish a cooperative working relationship based on mutual
respect. He did not fight the process. He worked very hard at
this. He kept the congressional relationship as businesslike and
nonpolitical as he could. He sought to act always in good faith
toward Congress, showing deference, respect, honesty, frankness,
and responsiveness. At the same time, he was his own person, who
refused to yield the high ground on fundamental matters,
especially involving inappropriate influence or other ethical
matters. In short, his relationship with Congress was cordial
but reservedly dignified. In return, Congress bestowed upon him
greater trust and confidence. An example of this from a Senate
hearing over appropriations in May 1940 is insightful. Senator
Commins said, "... we want this money spent properly and we
believe you are going to spend it properly." Senator Powers
followed by remarking, "May I say in closing, General Marshall-and I say this in all reverence--I think this committee and this

Congress has just got to trust in God and General Marshall to see
that these funds are expended properly." What made such trust
and confidence so enduring was that Marshall worked tirelessly to
live up to expectations.81

CHAPTER 7
INSTITUTIONAL VALUES
Marshall brought to his duties as Chief of Staff several
deeply ingrained values which he chose to emphasize across the
institution. Among the more prominent were efficiency,
responsiveness, teamwork, initiative, and morale. His emphasis
on these was, by and large, gradual and low-key, and initially
involved those most immediately associated with him, members of
the War Department General Staff and subordinate commanders.
Efficiency and Responsiveness.
The notion of efficiency was for Marshall inseparable from
that of professionalism, responsibility, and stewardship. He
himself felt the heavy burden of responsibility for the avoidance
of "waste" and for the efficient use of resources granted him by
Congress and the President. He soon discovered as Chief of Staff
that the tempo of War Department actions and activities was
increasing in quantum-leap fashion as the process of mobilization
began to gear up. This increased tempo, combined with an
antiquated War Department organization which centralized
virtually all major decision making around the Chief of Staff,
placed overwhelming demands on his time. Unable to reorganize the
Department radically for the present, Marshall chose to emphasize
efficiency, the application of which was intended to save time,
energy, and physical resources.82
First, to emphasize the urgency surrounding the need for
efficient operations, Marshall told new officers reporting to the
War Department as early as the summer of 1939 that they should
consider their jobs "as war assignments" and "approach their
problems as if they were at war." 83
From his staff he subsequently demanded concise, articulate
reports and studies which addressed issues in a frank,
straight-forward fashion. He was exceptionally impatient of
excess verbiage and set very high standards in this regard,
especially for any correspondence prepared for his signature.
Briefings were expected to be short and to the point. He grew
irritated at the slightest sign of muddled thinking or
articulation. He expected issues to be presented to him
logically, lucidly, and succinctly. Those presenting staff
papers were expected to understand them thoroughly and to make
recommendations for final action, whether or not they had
actually authored the papers.84
Second, in Marshall's mind, responsiveness and attention to
detail were inseparable from efficiency. With regard to this, he
wanted senior level staffs to respond rapidly and thoroughly to
the needs of units in the field. In January 1940, preparing for
his first scheduled series of maneuvers, Marshall sent a

memorandum to the General Staff:
The concentration of troops in the field amounts to a
partial mobilization of the regular establishment of
the Army....Therefore, action which affects the
comfort, efficiency, or unhampered operation of these
units, whether originating in the field or in the War
Department, will be followed through to its conclusion
by the responsible officer of the Staff, or of the arm
or service concerned, to avoid the inevitable delays
incident to routine procedure, and to insure that the
interests of the troops and the training objectives
are given the desired priority.
He wrote a few months later to the Commandant of the Infantry
School,
...we must effect a decided change in the state of mind
of all staff officers...to the end that anything that
concerns troops in the field will be considered as of
more importance than any other matter to be handled at
the moment. Also, that the officer first concerned
will feel a definite responsibility to speed the matter
on its way in the most effective fashion.
He also wrote in other correspondence about "the necessity
for guarding against the bureaucratic self-satisfied state of
mind."
He used his Inspector General (IG) frequently to search through
the War Department looking for just such conditions. Later that
same year, he even asked his IG to "look into the business of
expediting War Department administration by checking up on the
possible advantage of some rearrangement being made in the
conduct of offices pertaining to receiving, recording, and
distribution of papers." In the interest of responsiveness,
Marshall directed that all communication within the General Staff
be condensed in the basic document to a single page, simply
worded.85
In this connection, Marshall focused his attention beyond
the General Staff. He made frequent inspection trips across the
Army, always looking especially for signs of inefficiency. He
initiated corrective action immediately, and usually followed up
to ensure that the corrective action had been effective. His
letter in March 1941 to Brigadier General John P. Smith,
Commander of the 4th Corps Area, accurately conveys the spirit of
his intent:
...now I am rather fixed in the belief that some of the
[corps] headquarters are not functioning at the speed
demanded by the emergency. There is too much of the
time-clock procedure....The last has been a frequent
criticism of your headquarters from any number of

directions. I am inclined to think that several of
your staff are not sufficiently aggressive, energetic,
and far-seeing.86
Teamwork.
The third value to be highlighted is teamwork. For
Marshall, the concept was multidimensional. It applied first and
foremost to that coordination and cooperation within the Army
needed to build effective combined-arms formations capable of
operating effectively in battle. Marshall was constantly
striking the theme that "success in combat depends primarily upon
the development of the trained combat team composed of all arms."
Branch parochialism would immediately get one in hot water
with Marshall. He encouraged officers to develop a broader
understanding of how various branches could operate together for
greater overall effect. As early as 1938, while still Deputy
Chief of Staff, he told the students and faculty at the opening
of the Air Corps Tactical School to work in that direction:
Military victories are not gained by a single arm-though the failures of an arm might well be disastrous-but are achieved through the efforts of all arms and
services welded into an Army team.
He continued that many of the students would later be called
upon to fill positions as principal staff officers or as higher
commanders with mixed forces--"positions," he emphasized, "which
require an intimate knowledge of the combined arms, and a breadth
of vision impossible to the man who devotes his entire interest
to a single arm." To stimulate such thinking, for example,
Marshall attached pilots from the Advanced Flying School to
ground force commanders of companies, batteries, and troops
during the 1940 maneuvers.87
Teamwork also meant coordination and cooperation within the
General Staff. This flowed naturally as well from the value of
efficiency. Marshall expected the various elements of the staff
to share information readily which applied to other elements and
to coordinate thoroughly across the staff all reports, studies,
or issue papers coming to him for decision. An uncooperative
attitude in this sense was the undoing of many a staff officer,
whose days were often quickly numbered as a result. In addition,
the staff was expected to communicate decisions and actions taken
so that a coordinated follow-up effort could be made to ensure
proper and full implementation. Marshall had a comprehensive
memory. Any staff officer who presented him a problem about
which he had previously made a decision was likely to receive
"something akin to a verbal flaying."88
A third dimension of teamwork applied to interservice
cooperation with the Navy. As previously discussed, Marshall

worked hard to develop a strong cooperative relationship with the
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark. He also emphasized to
his staff the importance of cordial interservice relations on a
staff-to-staff basis, especially regarding joint planning. Staff
officers who were inherently hostile to the Navy found themselves
quickly dismissed from the General Staff. The emphasis he placed
on the mutual planning and execution of joint Army-Navy maneuvers
in early 1940 drove home the point. To make waves with the Navy,
especially to be undiplomatic or tactless, was considered a
serious incident. In this connection, his letter to the new Army
commander in Hawaii, written in February 1941, reflected this
attitude:
Please keep clearly in mind in all your negotiations
that our mission is to protect the base and the naval
concentration [at Pearl Harbor], and that purpose
should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmell. I
accentuate this because I found yesterday...in a matter
of extreme importance, that old Army and Navy feuds,
engendered from fights over appropriations, with the
usual fallacious arguments on both sides, still persist
in confusing issues of national defense. We must be
completely impersonal in these matters....89
Initiative.
Initiative is the fourth value to be highlighted. Marshall
felt strongly that modern, mobile warfare required fast- and
creative-thinking leaders who were willing to make decisions in
the absence of detailed orders or instructions. In his more
immediate surroundings in Washington, he wanted his staff to take
the initiative whenever it could to resolve problems at the
lowest level possible. During the 1920s and early 1930s, General
Staff procedure and tradition drove virtually every substantial
issue to the very top of the War Department for resolution.
Marshall abhorred this practice. He wanted men who would make
sound decisions, given general policy guidance, and then act on
them in their own spheres of responsibility. The ideal here was
speed and efficiency, both of which were lost when all decisions
were deferred to the very highest uniformed authority in the War
Department. When Eisenhower reported to the General Staff in
1941, Marshall told him bluntly: "...the Department is filled
with able men who analyze their problems well but feel compelled
always to bring them to me for final solution. I must have
assistants who will solve their own problems and tell me later
what they have done." Marshall was extremely tolerant of honest
mistakes born of taking initiative and usually supported and
encouraged subordinates, although, as they gained in experience,
he expected fewer errors.90
Marshall especially valued subordinates taking the
initiative in arguing against his positions or proposed courses
of action. They helped him immeasurably to see issues from many

angles so that when the final decision was made, it was based on
a thorough analysis. He despised "yes-men." Soon after Omar
Bradley became one of Marshall's assistants in 1940, he and the
other assistants were called in before the Chief. "Gentlemen,"
he said, "I'm disappointed in you. You haven't yet disagreed
with a single decision I've made." Bradley replied that they had
had no occasion to disagree, but when they did, they would speak
up. In the future they did. However, Marshall had made his
point, emphasizing the value he wished his assistants to
internalize.91
Morale.
The fifth value to be highlighted was critical for Marshall,
that of morale. Perhaps his most fundamental statement on the
topic came in November 1939 during a speech before the Community
Chest Committee in the nation's capital. "As a professional
soldier," he stated, "I know that high morale is the strongest
and most powerful factor in the Army, just as lack of morale will
bring about the defeat of almost any army however well armed."
On another occasion, he remarked that "morale...is the most
important factor in the makeup of an Army."92
Soldier morale was a function of many things. It involved
caring leaders who persistently looked after their men's welfare
and who helped attack the great destroyers of morale--inadequate
creature comforts, boredom, and a sense of unfair treatment. It
also involved public support, especially for civilian-soldiers
called to active duty--Reserve officers, draftees, and National
Guardsmen.93
Marshall made morale a headline topic in the Army. He
constantly stressed to commanders their obligations to build and
maintain sound morale as one of their primary command
responsibilities. He secured considerable funding for
recreational facilities and closely monitored progress around the
country in building them. During his many inspection trips,
considerations of morale and associated programs were among his
priority agenda items. Finally, in early 1941, he established a
Morale Branch on the General Staff and placed a general officer
in charge. Its purpose was to coordinate morale-related
activities, needs, and services more efficiently across the
entire Army. At the same time, he required every headquarters
down to, and including, the division level to establish a morale
officer as a full-time special staff officer. His intent was "to
bring forcibly to the attention of all Army personnel and
commanders the extreme importance of the matter." He wanted
commanders to give considerations of morale their close,
personal, continuing attention. "Since it is rather intangible,"
he wrote to an Army Commander in 1941, "it requires considerable
initiative, authority, and imaginative thinking. It usually
happened that the other more tangible duties were carried out,
and little time was left for the much more important question of

morale."94
By and large, Marshall succeeded in institutionalizing the
values of efficiency, responsiveness, teamwork, initiative, and
morale. He especially succeeded in inculcating those values in
the bright, young, promising leaders who worked closely with him
during the period, 1939-41. Genuine reflection of those values
was certainly a central consideration for promotion and
advancement. Among those leaders appeared such names as
Eisenhower, Bradley, Smith, Ridgeway, Gerow, Collins, Arnold,
Clark, Taylor, Eichelberger, McNair, and Spaatz.

CHAPTER 8
SHAPING THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
As previously discussed, Marshall envisioned two primary
developments with regard to War Department restructuring. First,
he wanted a General Staff which dealt primarily with issues of
broad policy and which could make decentralized decisions on
routine matters flowing from policy guidance; he also wanted a
staff which could comprehensively and responsively focus on key
issues and follow-up on decisions across staff lines of interest.
He wanted an efficient operation which filtered out unnecessary
clutter with which he had to deal so he could concentrate on
weightier concerns. In short, he wanted a setup whereby he made
decisions only involving issues truly appropriate to his level of
responsibility. He desired subordinates to make most decisions
in lesser matters. Second, he foresaw Army Air Forces operating
for the immediate future with something approximating autonomy
inside the War Department; at the same time, he wanted those
forces to forge a closer and more cooperative relationship with
the ground forces, especially in areas of mutual concern such as
planning and operations.95
Marshall did not work with detailed blueprints in hand.
Enlightened trial and error more aptly describes the process. He
tried several approaches, some of which just didn't turn out very
well. But in the end, by early 1942, he had largely realized his
objectives. Soon after entering the war, America had a
streamlined War Department organization vastly improved over that
of 1939 and capable of efficient strategic direction over
multiple theaters of war. America also entered the war with
strong, centralized, autonomous Air Forces which were, at the
same time, an integrated component of the Army's combined-arms
team.
Autonomy for Army Air.
When Marshall became Chief of Staff, he had to deal with
enormous animosities within the Army between air and ground
officers, especially evident in Washington. There were very few
air officers on the General Staff, which itself fluctuated from
indifference to hostility regarding air matters. Influential air
officers, on the other hand, spurned by the rest of the Army and
inspired by successful examples of independent air forces abroad,
lobbied Congress for independence and found significant resonance
there. It was a mess.96
Marshall endeavored to move more air officers into the
General Staff. He had difficulty, however, finding air officers
qualified to serve on the Staff by virtue of graduating from the
Army War College. Nonetheless, he moved in as many as he could
find. One of the most important was a former temporary Major
General and head of the Air Corps, then-Colonel Frank Andrews.

Marshall had him promoted to Brigadier General and assigned as
the G3 of the General Staff, in charge of training across the
entire Army. Andrews was the first aviator to hold such a
prestigious position on the Staff, and he performed there
exceptionally well.97
At the same time, Marshall pushed ground officers on the
Staff to develop a greater appreciation for air by flying to
distant posts for inspection trips. Some refused on the grounds
that private insurance companies at that time would not cover
travel by such a hazardous mode. Nonetheless, Marshall continued
to apply pressure. After a while, officers who persisted in
refusing to fly found themselves quietly reassigned. As Marshall
said years later, "...if you came in there, you flew." Also
quickly reassigned were ground officers who continued to display
a condescending or hostile attitude toward air officers. In both
instances, Marshall drove home his point. He expected
cooperation, teamwork, and mutual respect between the ground and
the air.98
Marshall worked as well in subtler ways. He ensured that
air perspectives and concerns were articulated in staff meetings
and that air interests were generally promoted in decision
making. He clearly supported Air Corps expansion programs,
including the acquisition of heavy bombers along with aircraft
capable of providing direct support to ground troops. In this
way, he cast a somewhat transparent but nonetheless effective,
protective umbrella around the Air Corps.99
The Chief of Staff also established a particularly close
relationship with then-Major General "Hap" Arnold, who had become
Chief of the Air Corps in 1938. Arnold agreed fully with
Marshall's designs for the Air Corps, and became a faithful
collaborator. Marshall was deeply impressed with Arnold's
abilities, both as a leader and an administrator. He ensured
that Arnold increasingly got opportunities to express his views
to the Secretary of War and the President, thereby helping him
establish credible credentials as the nation's chief spokesman
and advocate for air power. He also gave Arnold ever increasing
latitude to develop Army aviation across a broad spectrum of
activities.100
In the summer of 1940, Marshall activated General
Headquarters (GHQ) in Washington. The concept of this
headquarters emerged from post-World War I studies which
recommended a staff comparable to Pershing's GHQ which could
organize and lead a large expeditionary force into a theater of
operations. The General Staff's War Plans Division was supposed
to form the core of this headquarters. In concept, the Chief of
Staff, or some other commander designated by the President, was
supposed to use this headquarters to take the nation's field
forces overseas in war a la Pershing. Of course, the plan
assumed that the next war would follow the pattern of the
previous one, a war in a single theater of operations. The

dramatic Nazi victories in the spring of 1940 gave enormous
impetus to large-scale mobilization of American forces in the
months that followed. Marshall, increasingly overwhelmed by
detail, decided to activate GHQ, entrusting to it the associated
training function. While in name the Commander of GHQ, Marshall
delegated its day-to-day operations to a trusted subordinate,
Major General Lesley McNair, who was named chief of staff, GHQ.
McNair was charged to direct the training of the tactical units
of the Army, found primarily in the four field armies and the
armored force. This move greatly relieved Marshall from a
crushing load of detail and transferred it to what, in effect,
functioned as a subordinate headquarters with McNair fully in
charge.
The new GHQ continued to relieve both Marshall and the
General Staff of a whole host of problems associated with
induction and training, but the remaining demands continued to
grow until they all but consumed his available time. Finally, in
November 1940, Marshall moved to expand the number of Deputy
Chiefs of Staff from one to three. One deputy, as before, was
responsible for "all matters incident to General Staff business";
one deputy was made responsible for questions involving supply,
equipment, construction, and the Armored Force; the third was
responsible for air issues. To this last position, Marshall
appointed "Hap" Arnold, who retained his title and functions as
Chief of the Air Corps. This arrangement, although still far
from ideal, relieved Marshall of considerable time-consuming
detail work, with the three deputies now better able to filter,
clarify, and often resolve issues before they had to go to him.
The Air Corps rejoiced, for now their chief had both a greatly
elevated status and the consequent entree associated with it.
Things were looking up. The Air Corps seemed to be marching
steadily toward greater autonomy.101
This rejoicing, however, was short-lived. Two weeks later,
Marshall removed the General Headquarters Air Force (GHQ Air
Force) from under the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Air Corps
and subordinated it to the GHQ run by McNair. Since the GHQ Air
Force was charged with planning and conducting unit training and
combat operations, the move made considerable organizational
sense, given the GHQ's overall training function in the States
and its potential command function overseas. However, from the
view of most air leaders, the reorganization separated the
materiel and individual training functions administered through
the Air Corps from the unit training and combat operation
function handled by GHQ Air Force. Thus, the basic air functions
were organizationally separated. Marshall had hoped that Arnold,
in his dual capacity, could effectively coordinate the activities
of the two divided components of Army aviation. Actually Arnold
did a superb job trying. But nobody was really satisfied with
the arrangement, which was aborted 7 months later.102
In the interim, Marshall gave the air an enormous boost
toward greater autonomy in the staff realm. The Chief of Staff

observed with growing frustration that the air establishment was
"battered around in a maelstrom," organizationally trying to
coordinate its issues among the various General Staff sections,
where air matters at best were regarded as peripheral concerns.
Marshall finally responded in March 1941 with a simple directive,
in effect directing the Chief of the Air Corps thereafter to
prepare for final action all papers, studies, memoranda, and
other actions relating to purely Air Corps matters except those
pertaining to war plans and intelligence. In addition, the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air was told to coordinate all air
matters, to include those previously handled by the senior Deputy
Chief of Staff under the rubric of "General Staff business."
Marshall based this action on the need for improved efficiency,
given the upcoming increases in demands on the Air Corps tied to
expansion programs. The Chief of Staff also emphatically told
the G1, G3, and G4 not to delay matters affecting the air
establishment.103
The second- and third-order consequences of this simple
directive were profound. First, the staff of the Air Corps
acquired a degree of coordinating authority approaching that of
the General Staff sections. As a result, it would play a more
central role in planning activities and enjoy a more elevated
status than before within the War Department. Second, the
authority of both the Air Corps and the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Air was significantly expanded. Third, air issues would be
handled more expeditiously and cooperatively than ever before by
the General Staff. These results, which were consciously
intended by Marshall, amounted to a turning point in the movement
for autonomy of the air establishment.104
Increasingly dissatisfied with the divided aviation
functions, Marshall and the Secretary of War in March 1941
decided to place the entire air arm under a single commander.
Marshall initiated a study of how best to do this, and encouraged
Mr. Stimson to revive the position of Assistant Secretary of War
for Air. Secretary Stimson did so almost immediately and
appointed Robert A Lovett, who had been serving as special
assistant on air matters, to the position. His charter involved
two major tasks: promotion of aircraft production and
streamlining the organization of the air arm. The
reestablishment of this position elevated even further the
stature and priority linked with air matters within the War
Department.
In June, the new reorganization of the air arm went into
effect in accordance with a revised version of Army Regulation
95-5 (Status, Functions, and Organization of the Air Component).
The regulation established the Army Air Forces (AAF). Its
chief, General Arnold, was given control over two subordinate
organizations: the Air Corps and the Air Force Combat Command
(AFCC), the latter replacing the old GHQ Air Force. Thus,
administration, logistics, and combat operations were all placed
under Arnold's purview. In addition, Arnold, as Chief of the

AAF, was made directly responsible to the Chief of Staff and
given authority to establish comprehensive plans and policies for
all aspects of Army aviation. In keeping with Marshall's vision
for both greater decentralization within the War Department and
greater air establishment autonomy, the regulation provided the
AAF with an Air Staff to assist in policy formulation. General
Arnold also retained his position as Deputy Chief of Staff for
Air, serving as a high-level bridge between the AAF and the
General Staff. GHQ's responsibility for air force training was
limited to combined air-ground operations on those occasions when
air task forces would be attached, such as for maneuvers or for
overseas deployment.105
The impact of this reorganization was enormous. It raised
Arnold to unquestioned and unprecedented preeminence in all air
matters. Specifically, his duties encompassed determining
requirements for the AAF and the "preparation of necessary plans
for the development, organization, equipment, training, tactical
operations, supply, and maintenance thereof, including overseas
garrisons and task forces for theaters of operation and the
assignment of personnel and materiel thereto." Through the AFCC,
he controlled "all aerial operations" save for units assigned or
attached to task forces, overseas garrisons, or other commands.
He was also responsible for planning the air defense of the
United States. The broadened scope of these duties also ensured
promotion for him to lieutenant general. Brigadier General
Gerow, head of the War Plans Division of the General Staff, noted
in his office diary that the airmen had gained "a complete
autonomy similar in character to that exercised by the Marine
Corps of the Navy."106
Unfortunately, however, the GHQ and the AAF continued to
dispute their somewhat overlapping operational responsibilities.
Smelling even greater opportunities, some on the new Air Staff
offered a series of proposals for total independence of the Air
Forces inside a National Defense establishment. Marshall and
Arnold rejected these. But, Marshall gradually concluded that
GHQ would not be suited to exercise direction over theater level
commands overseas; rather, a streamlined and redesigned General
Staff would be the more appropriate instrument.107
Reorganizing the War Department.
Nonetheless, Marshall was reluctant to initiate a sweeping
reorganization of the General Staff in late 1941. He knew
generally want he wanted. But, as he recalled a few months
later, "...the difficulty was how to bring it about without so
much...dissention and opposition within the Army and on the Hill
and in the press that I would be stirring up a most unfortunate
morale situation at a critical moment and would also be defeating
my purpose." Thus, Marshall chose to refine reorganization
studies and plans for the present, awaiting a more propitious
opportunity to act.108

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the consequent
American entry into the war provided that opportunity. On
December 18, 1941, Congress gave the President sweeping authority
to reorganize the government under terms of the First War Powers
Act. This action paved the way legislatively for swift action.
Furthermore, the very nature of transition from a peacetime to a
wartime footing made fundamental organizational changes seem
suddenly more palatable and logical. Also, most of those likely
to protest a resultant loss in stature, the various chiefs of
arms and the adjutant general, were due to retire; the two not
scheduled to retire would be transferred to more important
positions for which they were fully qualified.109
Marshall thus chose to strike while the iron was hot. He
secured rapid approval for the reorganization plan from the
Secretary of War and the President. The latter then signed an
executive order, putting it into effect on March 9, 1942.
Marshall proceeded with a rapid, ruthless implementation for two
reasons. He wanted to prevent any coherent opposition from
developing before the changes were a fait accompli. And, amid
the enormous burdens of transitioning to war, any such sweeping
reorganization could be enormously disruptive if prolonged.110
The implementing circular fundamentally altered the role of
the General Staff. An expanded War Plans Division (later
redesignated the Operations Division, or OPD) was created to
serve as Marshall's global command post; it was to have
unprecedented coordinating authority across the entire General
Staff to increase efficiency and responsiveness. OPD's primary
functions were strategic planning and operations. It was charged
with comprehensively monitoring reports and inquiries from the
field, serving as a clearing house for information; with ensuring
that needed responses were taken; and with following up
holistically to ensure that all orders and directives, internal
and outgoing, were issued and executed. In short, the Operations
Division was in itself a self-contained, mini-General Staff, with
the coordinating authority and panoramic overview of activities
which the old General Staff was simply too fragmented in
structure to exercise. The remainder of the General Staff was to
be significantly reduced in size and was to focus on very broad
matters of policy beyond the purview of individual subordinate
commands. Across the entire General Staff, the intent ultimately
was that roughly half the members should be air officers. Beyond
doubt, this last measure would finally ensure an adequate level
of cooperation, understanding, and communication between air and
ground officers in all aspects of plans and operations.111
The reorganization also abolished GHQ, and created three
co-equal, autonomous commands to administer the Army in the Zone
of the Interior (i.e., the Continental United States): the Army
Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Services of Supply.
All three commands reported directly to the Chief of Staff. The
Commander of Army Ground Forces was responsible for all aspects

of preparing ground forces to fight overseas (e.g., doctrine,
equipment, organization structure, training, and schools). The
Commander of Army Air Forces assumed responsibility for all air
personnel, aviation equipment procurement and disposition,
training, doctrine, aircraft development, specific air forces
construction and supply, and all aerial operations except by
units assigned to other commands. The Commander of the Services
of Supply had purview over all general supply, procurement,
construction, transportation, and administration matters.112
Thus, the Reorganization of March 1942 marked an achievement
that Marshall had generally envisioned when he assumed office.
The Army Air Forces had gained virtual autonomy within the War
Department, but were more than ever an integrated part of the
Army's combined-arms team. The three Zone-of-the-Interior
commands relieved the General Staff and Marshall himself from a
myriad of issues, which could now be worked out, for the most
part, within those commands. Only issues applying to two or more
commands, or too difficult to resolve at lower levels, would now
percolate up to Marshall. This freed him considerably from the
tyranny of detail, and enabled him to focus on matters of broad
policy and strategy appropriate to his level of responsibility.
Just as important, he now had a streamlined General Staff with a
broader outlook to match his own. Within that Staff the
Operations Division served as a center to monitor situations
around the globe and as a conduit for orders and directions.
Just as important to Marshall, OPD had the requisite coordinating
authority to orchestrate comprehensive, rapid responses across
the General Staff on important matters; it also had the charter
to follow up so that nothing "fell through the cracks" due to
neglect or compartmentalized thinking within the General Staff or
within subordinate headquarters.
Marshall's actions during the prewar years thus demonstrated
great skill in using organizational structuring and restructuring
to influence the fulfillment of his vision, as well as the
reinforcement of desired institutional values. Those values-especially teamwork, responsiveness, efficiency and initiative-were promoted by the changes he instituted.

CHAPTER 9
STRATEGY
George Marshall, prior to becoming Chief of Staff, had
acquired little direct experience in strategic planning. It is
truly amazing, therefore, to analyze the remarkable
transformation he underwent in this arena from 1939 until early
1942. The catalyst in this transformation was the dramatic
sequence of events overseas, which portrayed an ever more
aggressive Germany, Italy, and Japan increasingly threatening the
existing international order.
In his first 9 months as Chief of Staff, Marshall focused
almost exclusively on the ways and means to rebuild and train the
American Army. His time and energies were consumed by that
effort. Strategic considerations remained in the background of
his attentions. At the same time, Germany had yet to fight
France and Britain in Western Europe. Most Americans envisioned,
at worst, a repeat of the World War I scenario, in which their
country would enter a stalemated ground war on the Western Front
to deliver the coup de grace to an exhausted foe.113
Marshall appears during this period to have largely accepted
such a scenario with one key exception. He presciently felt that
any American expeditionary force sent overseas would have to be
fully ready to fight a campaign as soon as it landed--totally
unlike Pershing's American Expeditionary Force (AEF) of World War
I. This thinking permeated his arguments on behalf of a greatly
expanded Army experienced in large-unit maneuvers at the corps
and field army levels. He articulated those sentiments to
Congress as early as November 27, 1939:
The First Division of the A.E.F. arrived in France in
July 1917 and entered into intensive training, for the
first time, as a division. It was not prepared to take
its position in the line until the following January,
even under the forced training schedule of a unit in
wartime within sound of the guns on the battle front.
Fortunately, under the protection of the Allies, it was
given a year in which to find itself....The future
problems for our Army visualize no such protected
period for overcoming peacetime military deficiencies.
We must be prepared to stand on our own feet from the
outset.114
Hemispheric Defense.
The cataclysmic events of the spring and summer of 1940
added a new dimension to Marshall's strategic thinking--serious
concern about the security of the Western Hemisphere. Some
concern had existed beforehand. He had previously emphasized
that one of the Army's two general missions was to "prevent the

domination of territory in the Western Hemisphere by an overseas
power." He had also argued that a violation of the Monroe
Doctrine by European powers was "not beyond the realm of
possibility." He specially regarded Nazi designs to take over
Brazil and Venezuela as a credible threat; both countries had
substantial German populations, which could serve as a fifth
column, using subversion and sabotage to seize power under a
pro-German, fascist banner. Nonetheless, such concerns had been
relatively fuzzy in nature. But Germany's Blitzkrieg victories
over Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries, France, and Britain now
made follow-up threats to the Western Hemisphere seem much more
specific and acute. It did not require much imagination to
envisage a complete Axis victory in Europe, involving perhaps
even the surrender or conquest of Great Britain. If the Germans
thereby acquired both the French and British fleets, they would
be in a position to invade the Western Hemisphere. The rapid
conquest of Norway on the cheap was seen as the model for the
initiation of such a campaign.115
Much of Marshall's rationale for requesting the
federalization of the National Guard and the Selective Service
Act in the summer of 1940 was couched in terms of hemispheric
defense. His considerable efforts to upgrade defenses in the
Panama Canal Zone and in the Caribbean area resulted directly
from this thinking. Indeed, Marshall could hardly have advocated
sending American ground troops overseas to fight, given American
policy and public sentiment to avoid involvement in another
European war. Even his fuzzy hinting of such involvement a year
later in his first biennial report triggered a sharp outcry.116
However, the call to bolster hemispheric defenses did
provide a publicly palatable rationale for expanding air and
ground forces; they had the legitimate mission to deal with a
plausible contingency near to home shores--and something the Navy
alone might not be able to handle, such as a fascist coup in
Brazil or even Panama. In this regard, the popular sentiments
surrounding the Monroe Doctrine were extremely supportive. Even
for mainstream isolationist thought, hemispheric security seemed
a logical extension of the notion of self-defense, unlikely to
stir up the fundamental fear of foreign entanglements. Yet,
unlike defense at America's shores, hemispheric security required
the ability to project forces--land, sea, and air--to defeat
incursions and to man crucial outposts such as the Panama
Canal.117
Despite his belief in likely threats to the hemisphere,
Marshall continued quietly in his thinking that America could
well get directly involved in the European war. He did not,
however, at this point see such involvement as inevitable.
Nonetheless, he proceeded to plan further mobilization efforts
with this kind of involvement in mind, as a sort of worst-case
scenario.

"Europe First."
Marshall also began to direct increasing attention to war
planning. The Navy's preferred orientation in previous planning
had focused on the Pacific, specifically involving war with
Japan. And, indeed, the Japanese in the fall of 1940 seemed
determined to pursue a course of regional hegemony which put them
on a collision course with America. In September, they occupied
northern Indochina and announced joining the Rome-Berlin Axis.
The likelihood of a two-theater war now loomed larger than ever
before.118
Marshall's resultant thinking began to coalesce around the
concept that in such a two-theater war, the priority of U.S.
interests lay in the Atlantic and in Europe. He articulated this
view increasingly in broader planning circles. Within a
relatively short span of time, both he and Admiral Stark were in
full agreement on the issue. When Stark published a
comprehensive strategic analysis in November 1940 recommending a
Europe-first strategy, Marshall threw his complete support behind
it. Together, he and Stark convinced the Secretary of the Navy,
the Secretary of War, and the President to accept it in principle
by January 1941.119
The supporting assertion was the recognition that America's
security rested to a very large extent on the fate of Great
Britain. Stark argued in his analysis that "...if Britain wins
decisively against Germany we could win everywhere; but that if
she loses the problems confronting us would be very great; and
while we might not lose everywhere, we might, possibly, not win
anywhere." If Great Britain collapsed, the victorious Axis powers
would eventually seek expansion, first economically and then
militarily, into the Western Hemisphere. Thus, Britain must be
assisted in every possible way. An all-out simultaneous war
against Japan in the Pacific would draw essential resources away
from the more critical effort in Europe. Even Japan's defeat
would not contribute significantly to the more important
objectives of defending the Western Hemisphere and preserving
Great Britain. The conclusion drawn was that in a two-theater
war the United States could "do little more in the Pacific than
remain on a strict defensive." Also embedded in the analysis was
the assessment that Great Britain had neither the manpower nor
materiel to defeat Germany alone; the assistance of powerful
allies would ultimately be required; furthermore, blockade and
air bombardment, the means favored by the British, would be
inadequate by themselves to resolve the war. The only certain
way to defeat Germany was "by military success on shore." This
would require the United States to send large land and air forces
to participate in a great land offensive.120
Thus, Marshall and his naval counterpart played the leading
roles in both developing and selling the "Germany-first" approach
which became the centerpiece of American strategy during World

War II. The British supported this approach in the ensuing secret
British-American staff conferences in Washington, January-March
1941. A few months later, the Joint Board completed RAINBOW 5,
the umbrella plan which outlined the objectives and missions of
American forces in a two-theater, Germany-first war.121
Strategic Unity Of Command.
Shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack and America's
consequent entry in the war, the leaders of Great Britain and the
United States assembled in Washington for a conference,
christened Arcadia. Meeting from December 22, 1941 until January
14, 1942, these leaders attempted to identify and come to grips
with the fundamental issues surrounding their new Allied
relationship. Quickly, they confirmed the Germany-first approach
and went on to deal with a host of related issues.
Then, on Christmas Day, while discussing the disposition of
reinforcements en route to the Southwest Pacific area, Marshall
stunned all present. As a result of his World War I experience,
he asserted "that the most important consideration is the
question of unity of command....I am convinced that there must be
one man in command of the entire theater--air, ground, and ships.
We cannot manage by cooperation....If we make a plan for unified
command now, it will solve nine-tenths of our troubles." He
continued, saying that the one man in control would operate under
a charter, or "controlled directive," supplemented as necessary
with additional guidance, issued by the military service chiefs
of Britain and the United States. He continued:
We had to come to this in the first World War, but it
was not until 1918 that it was accomplished and much
valuable blood, and treasure had been needlessly
sacrificed. If we could decide on a unified command
now, it would be a great advance over what was
accomplished during the World War.122
The initial reaction by all present was negative. Neither
Admiral Stark nor Admiral King, the Commander of the U.S. Fleet,
rallied to his support. The issue was delicately tabled for the
rest of the meeting.
But Marshall persisted. At the next meeting, he showed up
with draft sample orders to a theater commander. Now the group
had something concrete to examine and discuss. The document was
in the form of a letter of instructions, defining the mission,
and the authority granted. It also excluded from his authority
any interference in matters which were strictly the business of
any particular government; this assured all present that no real
risk was involved to the interests of any Allied power. He next
suggested that the Far Eastern Theater be the first so organized;
he named this theater ABDA, an acronym for Australian, British,
Dutch, and American. As a sweetener, Marshall suggested that a

British general, Sir Archibald Wavell, be named supreme
commander.123
The next day, after extensive discussion, Marshall convinced
the President, as well as Admirals Stark and King, to support the
proposal. Finally, after extensive debates and behind-the-scenes
lobbying, he personally convinced a very reluctant Churchill and
the British chiefs of staff to accede. This approach, applied
initially only to ABDA, was intended as the eventual command
model for all theaters of war.124
The Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Marshall then threw his full support behind a British
proposal for the composition and organization of the Allied
council which would give the theater supreme commanders their
directives. He quickly garnered support from the President, as
well as from Admirals Stark and King. This council, to be known
as the Combined Chiefs of Staff, would consist of the British
Chiefs of Staff and their American counterparts; it would report
collectively to the President and the Prime Minister.
Furthermore, the seat of the Combined Chiefs would be in
Washington; the British would station a Joint Staff Mission there
to represent their chiefs of staff in regular meetings with their
American counterparts. Making Washington the single seat of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff was also the result of Marshall's
insistence. The original proposal had called for two co-equal
seats, Washington and London, an arrangement less likely to
produce the unity of effort and unity of command Marshall
sought.125
Marshall's performance during the Arcadia Conference left a
deep impression. Like a man possessed, he had pursued the
concept of unity of command in theaters of war, exercised through
supreme commanders answering to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He
articulately pleaded the case, gradually winning broad
acceptance. In so doing, he played the undisputed leading role in
providing the Allies with an effective instrument for close
cooperation, unity of effort, and strategy formulation virtually
unprecedented in scope and magnitude.
In the process, Marshall established himself as a diplomatic
but forceful personality. He emerged from the Arcadia Conference
as the chief American spokesman, the primus inter pares, of the
U.S. military representatives. Over time, he would achieve the
same status among the Combined Chiefs of Staff as a whole.126

CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION
During his prewar years as Chief of Staff, George Marshall
was concerned primarily with the challenge of preparing the Army
for war. Events in Europe made the eventual commitment there of
American ground forces very imaginable for him, although the
specific conditions and situations of such a commitment were
ambiguous. Driven by his own poignant experiences from World War
I, Marshall determined that the Army must be ready to fight
coherently in large formations as polished, combined-arms teams
when the war began. This meant as well that all modern supplies
and equipment, in addition to a warm, functioning industrial base
to support sustainment and expansion, had to be on hand from the
onset. His strategic vision thus revolved around the efforts
comprehensively to expand and upgrade the Army during this
period. With the Army's small size, its inadequate level of
training, its obsolescent equipment, its virtually nonexistent
military industrial base, its underdeveloped Air Corps, and its
anachronistic War Department organization, the tasks associated
with implementing this vision seemed staggering. They consumed
the great bulk of his time and energies from 1939 through 1941.
Given the generally unsympathetic attitude in Washington and
around the country in 1939 toward any steps which smacked of
involvement in another European ground war, Marshall's
achievements over the next 2 1/2 years were truly remarkable.
Without question, Marshall's actions addressed in a
particularly impressive way all aspects of strategic leadership
which were abstractly postulated at the beginning of this report.
He developed, articulated, and followed a vision which served as
the enduring road map for himself and the Army. In the process
of implementing his vision, he demonstrated extremely adept
interpersonal talents. In this regard, his ability to persuade
diverse groups, to develop networks of influential contacts, and
to make timely compromises was critically important. In
connection with, and in support of, his vision, he strongly
promoted certain crucial values across the Army as an
institution--namely, efficiency, responsiveness, teamwork,
initiative, and morale.
In addition, he consistently revealed an indepth
understanding of the derivative effects of actions, as well as of
a related keen awareness of the timing associated with execution.
His means of gaining feedback from the Army at large were
effective--ranging from his many, frequent inspection trips, to
the broad use of his Inspector General, to his copious, direct
correspondence with subordinate commanders. Marshall definitely
kept his fingers on the pulse of the Army as it expanded.
While so doing, he rapidly advanced a whole new leadership
generation into the general officer ranks, based on demonstrated

skills, adherence to institutional values, and potential for
increased responsibility. By and large, these young leaders
covered themselves with distinction during the ensuing war years,
and well beyond.
Marshall's strategic leadership was also manifested by the
fashion in which he progressively evolved the War Department's
organizational structure to reflect both his vision and his
desired institutional values. This evolution itself comprised an
insightful lesson in the art of the possible and the timing of
related actions.
In the realm of strategy formulation, he played a central
role in shaping the acceptance of the "Germany-first" approach as
the linchpin of American wartime strategy. He went on to play
the central role in formulating the highly successful
Anglo-American wartime structure at a very formative point in the
Alliance. The employment of theater supreme commanders reporting
back through the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and
the Prime Minister was clearly a creature of his making; it was
adopted only because he doggedly persisted without much
encouragement in pursuing the concept. Some authors have gone so
far as to characterize the acceptance of this setup as the single
most important strategic contribution of the war--a necessary
prerequisite for the unprecedented unity of command which
undergirded subsequent Allied success.
George Marshall clearly made a difference. He started out
in 1939 as a relative unknown in Washington circles and emerged 2
1/2 years later as one of this nation's better known and
influential figures. He had to face squarely many unpopular
issues which politicians of all types just didn't want to handle.
Yet, he persisted in focusing attention on them, articulating
the Army's needs relative to them, and forcing politicians over
and over again to view the issues in a different light--the
nonpolitical perspective of national security. To be sure,
Marshall was helped repeatedly by developments abroad. But all
his fights still remained uphill ones against the odds. In this
connection, it is hard to imagine America being as ready for
World War II as it was without the yeoman efforts of its Army
Chief of Staff. Marshall and Marshall alone made the
federalization of the National Guard and the Selective Service
Act realities in 1940. Again, he alone engineered the term of
service extensions for the National Guardsmen, Reserve officers,
and inductees in 1941, an act which kept a coherent force from
disintegrating completely. Marshall made the autonomy of the
Army Air Forces a reality while ensuring that air and ground
forces formed a better combined-arms team. He pushed hard for a
firm organizational structure to reflect Anglo-American adherence
to an unprecedented degree of Allied unity of command. All these
results had an important and lasting impact on this country's
later performance in the war. These achievements appear
impressive in retrospect. They appear truly monumental looking
forward from the perspective of 1939. Unquestionably, they alone

place George Marshall among the great American strategic leaders
of this century.
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